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DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE HOME-TYPE
RECEIVER EXEMPTION IN 17 U.S.C. § 110(5):
CASS COUNTY MUSIC CO. v. MUEDINI
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest reported copyright cases, courts have strug-
gled to develop the most productive balance between copyright
protection and information dissemination.' This struggle fre-
quently pits the creative artist's interest in the control and exploita-
tion of his or her work against society's competing interest in the
free flow of ideas, information and commerce. 2 As technology
advances and society's access to the arts increases, the tension be-
tween these competing interests creates far reaching implications
for commercial users of copyrighted music. Remarkably, even
small restaurant owners who play background music hoping to
make the dining atmosphere more comfortable may now find
themselves deeply entangled in this struggle if they refuse to pay
required licensing fees. 3
Generally, musical copyright owners enjoy statutory protec-
tions regarding the use of their works within a commercial estab-
lishment.4 As a general rule, a business owner may not use
copyrighted music commercially, unless the business owner obtains
the musical copyright owner's permission. 5
1. See Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (1785) (Lord Mansfield).
2. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
Increasing the scope of copyright protection rewards an intellectual creator by en-
hancing the author's opportunity to exploit the creation. See Peter S. Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1045, 1059 (1989). This economic incentive encourages inventive activity and
stimulates creators to discover new and better products. See id.
3. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1995). For a
discussion of the facts in Muedini, see infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994). Section 106 provides in relevant part:
§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works.
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the follow-
ing: . . .
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly....
Id.
5. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1979) (citing Act ofJan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481-82). While a business owner desiring
(147)
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to use copyrighted music may seek out the individual copyright owner to negotiate
a fee for using the copyright owner's works, this approval method is seldom used
for two reasons. SeeJohn Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictions
in the Construction of 17 U.S.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 783, 784 n.11
(1993). First, the transactional costs are prohibitive to a user who seeks to license
multiple copyright owners' works. See id. Second, the copyright owner's infringe-
ment monitoring costs are prohibitively high. See id. In response, several music
licensing organizations have evolved to facilitate the functioning of the market
place for copyright owners and users. See id. Three groups, the American Society
of Composers Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and
Society of European Songwriters, Authors and Composers, Inc. (SESAC, Inc.)
dominate this market. See id. (discussing ASCAP and BMI); see also Broadcast Music,
Inc., 441 U.S. at 4-5 (discussing ASCAP and BMI). Each society is built on a differ-
ent set of alliances and different marketing strategies. See MICHAEL D. ScorT, MuL-
TIMEDIA: LAw & PRACTICE § 26.04 at 26-8 (Prentice Hall, 1995 Supp.). For
example, while both ASCAP and BMI license broadcast rights, songwriters and
publishers own ASCAP while radio and television broadcasters own BMI. See id. at
26-9. One commentator metaphorically advises that one must know what to do
and what to avoid in order to know the way through this "labyrinth of music licens-
ing." Id.
ASCAP, the organization involved in Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, was
organized by a small group of composers led by Victor Herbert in 1914 because
"those who performed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous and wide-
spread, and most performances so fleeting, that as a practical matter it was impossi-
ble for the many individual copyright owners to negotiate with and license the
users and to detect unauthorized uses." International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk,
855 F.2d 375, 376 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. ASCAP,
400 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). ASCAP serves as a clearinghouse for copy-
right owners and users to meet each other's music licensing needs. See Broadcast
Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5. (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 400 F. Supp. at 741).
In 1939, CBS led broadcasting industry members to form the nonprofit organ-
ization called BMI, the other dominant player in this market. See id. at 5.
Although CBS liquidated its interests in BMI in 1959, BMI represents thousands of
publishing companies, authors and composers in a similar capacity to ASCAP. See
id. at 5 n.4.
Together, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC serve the copyright interests of copyright
owners and users. Typically, a musical copyright owner registers the copyright with
one of the organizations and becomes an ASCAP member, or a SESAC or BMI
affiliate. See id. at 4-5 (describing process copyright owners follow to protect their
works through licensing organizations); see also Wilk, supra, at 784 n. 11 (same).
This registration allows the user to negotiate with the organization for a non-exclu-
sive license to use the copyrighted work. See Wilk, supra, at 784 n. 11. The user pays
an annual fee for the license to publicly perform the copyrighted material an un-
limited number of times. See id.
All three organizations primarily issue "blanket licenses" to users of copy-
righted music. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5. A "blanket license" gives the
licensee the right to perform all the organization's titles as often as the licensee
desires within a stated term. Id. By the late 1970s, the combined repertories of
ASCAP and BMI ran into the millions, and contained almost every domestic copy-
righted composition in existence. See id.; Wilk, supra, at 784 n.ll.
The organizations ordinarily compute blanket license fees using a total reve-
nue percentage or a flat dollar amount, irrespective of the amount or type of mu-
sic used. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5. In 1994, where establishments
used mechanical music, ASCAP, SESAC and BMI used a graduated fee schedule
based on factors such as the number of speakers used and the commercial estab-
lishment's floor space. See E.S. Johnson, Storecasting and the Copyright Law-Under-
standing the § 110(5) Exemption for Small Commercial Establishments, NAB HelpFax
2
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss1/7
1997] LIMrrs OF THE HOME-TYPE RECEIVER EXEMPTION 149
The 1976 Copyright Act carves out a small exception to this
rule for businesses who play radio broadcasts via home-style receiv-
ing systems - the "home-style exemption."6 Under the home-style
exemption, a business owner may not charge admission to hear the
music or further transmit the music to the public.7 In today's cli-
mate of rapidly advancing technologies, courts face significant diffi-
culties when they attempt to apply this vague standard to different
businesses and evolving audio equipment.8 The Seventh Circuit's
decision in Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini directly addressed sec-
tion 110(5)'s home-style exemption. 10 Focusing on the sound
system's capabilities, the Muedini court denied section 110(5) pro-
tection to a restaurant owner who played radio background music
over a Radio Shack brand receiver connected through separate
transformers to nine in-ceiling speakers." In rendering its deci-
#2121 (1992) p.S-4 , in NAB LEGAL GUIDE TO BROADCAST LAW & REGULATION 4th
Ed., (Washington D.C. National Association of Broadcasters, 1994), Appendix A.
ASCAP, SESAC and BMI distribute collected licensee fees to copyright owners
based on usage as determined by statistical surveys. See Wilk, supra, at 784 n.l1.
Radio and television broadcasters represent the largest music users and holders of
blanket licensee. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5; see generally, SI-rILA
NATARAJ KIRBY & STANLEY M. BESEN, COMPENSATING CREATORS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1989) (discussing distributions to authors of copyrighted materials);
Bernard Korman & I.F. Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing
Rights Societies, 33J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 332 (1986) (discussing copyright licensing re-
quirements for musical works). In 1995, ASCAP collected $436.8 million in per-
forming rights fees and other fees, and distributed $356.7 million to members and
foreign affiliated societies, making the Society the largest distributor of perform-
ance royalties in the world. See ASCAP, 1995 Annual Report 3-4 (1995), in ASCAP
PLAYBACK, Summer 1996, at 8-9.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1996). Section 110 provides in relevant part:
§ 110. Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption of certain perform-
ances and displays.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not in-
fringements of copyright: . ..
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or dis-
play of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a sin-
gle receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,
unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public ....
Id.
7. See id.
8. 2 MFLvInLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18, at 8-
215 (1995) ("This, then, leaves some vague area of interpretation where courts will
be called upon to apply the exemption to particular fact situations."). A variety of
anomalous decisions resulted from this ambiguous standard. See Wilk, supra note
5, at 785.
9. 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995).
10. See id. at 268.
11. See id.
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sion, the Seventh Circuit raised serious doubts about whether
courts will ever establish a bright line rule to determine when a
small business owner qualifies for the home-type exemption under
section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act. 12
This Note examines the Seventh Circuit's decision in Muedini
and assesses the feasibility of a bright line rule for applying section
110(5). Part II describes the factual foundation upon which the
Muedini court based its holding. 13 Part III examines the relevant
copyright law developments both before and after Congress en-
acted section 110(5).14 Part IV carefully dissects the Muedini court's
analysis, explaining the arguments the court accepted and those it
rejected. 15 Part V discusses how the court's holding simplifies the
section 110(5) analysis, but fails to establish a workable bright line
rule for future cases. 16 Finally, Part VI assesses the practical reper-
cussions of the Muedini decision for small business owners using
background music, and suggests simpler considerations to help re-
solve potential home-type exemption controversies. 17
II. FACTrS
In 1992, Vasfi Muedini owned and operated the Port Town
Family Restaurant in Racine, Wisconsin.18 The restaurant consisted
of a free standing building that could accommodate a maximum of
128 patrons in a 1,500 square foot dining area.19
12. See id. The Muedini court announced, "what is a 'single receiving appara-
tus of the kind commonly used in private homes' must be determined on a case-by-
case basis." Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)).
13. See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 41-191 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 211-230 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 231-237 and accompanying text.
18. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 265, 266 (7th Cir. 1995).
Evidence indicates that Muedini owned the restaurant from at least 1985, until
June 16, 1994. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2 n.3, Cass County Music Co. v.
Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 92-C-706); Irwin Aft., Cass County Music
Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 92-C-706). On June 16, 1994,
Tom Pam purchased the Port Town Restaurant from Muedini. See Irwin Aff.,
Muedini (No. 92-C-706). Pam kept the existing stereo system but changed the res-
taurant's name to the River Run Restaurant. See id.
19. See Appellants' Brief at 6, Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263
(7th Cir. 1995) (No. 92-C-706). Muedini's restaurant contained approximately 31
tables, of which 16 were free standing and 15 were booths. Brief of Amicus Curiae
at 2, Muedini (No. 92-C-706).
[Vol. 4: p. 147
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To provide his patrons with background music, Muedini
equipped his restaurant with a "radio-over-speaker" sound system. 20
The system utilized a Radio Shack receiver 21 connected by con-
cealed speaker wire22 to nine speakers that were recessed into a
dropped acoustic tile ceiling.2 3 In addition, Muedini equipped
each speaker with a seventy-volt transformer to allow the receiver to
power the entire system without appreciable signal degradation. 24
With a total rated power output of forty watts per channel,
Muedini's customized setup, known as a distributed seventy-volt sys-
tem, could power thirty-six more speakers than Radio Shack in-
tended its factory receiver to handle without overloading. 25 Tuned
to a Milwaukee radio station,26 Muedini's sound system provided a
consistent and evenly audible level of background music through-
out the public seating area.2 7
When the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers ("ASCAP") discovered Muedini's background music use, the
organization opined that Muedini required a license to use the
copyrighted music.2 8 From May 1985 until December 1991, ASCAP
20. Muedini, 55 F.3d at 267. A "radio-over-speaker" sound system describes an
arrangement where a sound system receives a radio broadcast and plays the broad-
cast through one or more loudspeakers. Id. at 264-68.
21. See id. at 267-68. Muedini used a Realistic Model No. STA-700 AM/FM 40-
watt stereo receiver/amplifier. See Appellant's Brief at 6, Muedini (No. 92-C-706).
At the time of trial, the receiver cost approximately $200. See Muedin 55 F.3d at
268.
22. See Muedin, 55 F.3d at 268.
23. See id. Each speaker consisted of a 12 inch aluminum grille, an 8 inch
loudspeaker and a 70-volt loudspeaker, line matching transformer. See id.
24. See id. With the 70-volt transformers attached to each speaker, the nomi-
nal impedance load presented to the amplifier in the receiver increased
from 8 Ohms to 10,000 Ohms. See id. This increase in impedance allowed
Muedini's system to power up to 40 speakers wired in parallel with 1,000 feet of
low-medium gauge wire. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 265. The radio station, WMYX-FM was an ASCAP licensee. See id.
The radio station's license agreement with ASCAP provided:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as granting, or as authoriz-
ing Licensee to grant to others any right to perform publicly.., any of
the musical compositions licensed under this agreement, or as authoriz-
ing any receiver of any radio broadcast to perform publicly or reproduce
the same in any manner.
Id.
27. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 269.
28. See id. at 265. For a discussion of ASCAP's creation and purpose, see supra
note 5. Precisely how ASCAP became aware of Muedini's copyright use remains
unknown. However, licensing similar business establishments falls within the ordi-
nary business practices of ASCAP. SeeAppellants' Brief at 7 n.5, Muedini (No. 92-C-
706).
5
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used letters29 and personal contacts30 to persuade Muedini to ob-
tain an ASCAP license.31 Muedini disregarded ASCAP's requests,
refused to obtain a license and continued to use his sound system
to play background music. 32
On Saturday, March 13, 1992, ASCAP sent two independent
investigators to Muedini's restaurant to note the number of patrons
that dined there and whether Muedini played copyrighted music. 33
While eating, the investigators heard WMYX-FM broadcasts played
over Muedini's system.3 4 They remained in the restaurant for three
and one-half hours and identified at least six songs whose
copyrights ASCAP members owned.3 5 The copyright owners subse-
quently brought suit against Muedini under 17 U.S.C. § 106, to en-
join Muedini from playing any copyrighted music at the restaurant
and to recover statutory damages,36 costs and attorneys' fees. 3 7
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin dismissed the plaintiff copyright owners' suit on their mo-
29. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 3, Muedini (No. 92-C-706). ASCAP's first
letter to Muedini, written June 1985, asserted that "performances of music by
means of radio broadcasts over loudspeakers in establishments such as yours must
be licensed by the copyright owners." Id. (quoting Letter from ASCAP to Vasfi
Muedini (June 1985)). ASCAP's letter of March 1, 1988 dealt specifically with 17
U.S.C. § 110(5), the radio over speaker exemption and legislative history. See Ap-
pellants' Brief at 4-5, Muedini (No. 92-C-706) (construing Letter from ASCAP to
Vasfi Muedini (March 1, 1988)). In the letter ASCAP provided reasons why it
thought the exemption failed to cover Port Town Restaurant's background music.
See id.
30. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Muedini (No. 92-C-706). During one
personal contact which took place on September 9, 1987, Muedini told a visiting
ASCAP representative that an attorney informed him that "his business was not the
type that needs this franchises due." Id.
31. See Appellants' Brief at 7, Muedini (No. 92-C-706).
32. See id. By April 1993, ASCAP licensed 151 Wisconsin restaurants and simi-
lar establishments where, as at the Port Town Family Restaurant, the only en-
tertainment was mechanical music, i.e. radio-over-speaker, audio cassettes or
compact discs. Id. at 7 n.5. Of the 151 licensees, 67 paid the $327 annual fee
which ASCAP proposed for Port Town, 71 paid a lesser fee, and 13 paid a greater
fee. See id. ASCAP arrived at the $327 license fee using a "rate schedule" based
upon the restaurant's seating capacity, type of musical entertainment, and number
of days or nights per week the establishment opened for business. Id. ASCAP
incorporated the rate schedule into its "General Licence Agreement" and offered
this agreement to "all similarly situated music users." Id.
33. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 265.
34. See id. For a description of the radio station and its relationship with AS-
CAP, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 821 F. Supp. at 1278, 1279 (E.D.
Wis. 1993).
36. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiffs requested $1,000 for each song that the investigators heard on March 13.
See id.
37. See id.
[Vol. 4: p. 147
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tion for summary judgment and held that Muedini needed no
license to perform the copyrighted works as background music in
his restaurant.38 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's dismissal and held that Muedini did not qualify for the
section 110(5) exemption because he did not use a home-style
sound system.3 9
III. BACKGROUND
Current standards regarding copyright protection for public
performance of musical works emerge from a patchwork of evolv-
ing legislation and judicial precedent. Early copyright legislation
completely ignored the musical copyright owner's ability to control
public performances of the author's work.40 However, around the
turn of the century, Congress granted copyright owners the right to
control public performances rendered "for profit."41 Early court
decisions42 grappled with this "for profit" condition until, Congress
overhauled the entire copyright statute in 1976.43 With the 1976
Act's passage, musical copyright owners received broadened protec-
tion, including the explicit right to control public performances of
their works. 44 However, section 110(5) of the 1976 Act provides an
exemption for performances that occur via a "home-style receiving
apparatus." 45 Similar to the earlier "for profit" language, the lan-
guage of the "home style exemption" poses an interpretive dilemma
for modem courts.46 This dilemma forces courts to draw lines be-
tween private and commercial grade equipment and then redraw
these lines as technology advances.
38. See Muedini, 821 F. Supp. at 1279. The district court also denied the copy-
right owners' motion for default judgment. See id. The copyright owners re-
quested reconsideration of the decision to dismiss. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 265.
The district court granted a further hearing, but upheld its decision and entered
judgment. See id.
39. See Muedin, 55 F.3d at 269.
40. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 56-96 and accompanying text.
43. For a further discussion of these amendments, see infra notes 97-126 and
accompanying text.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). For a discussion of the "home-style exemption" legis-
lation, see supra notes 97-126 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion ofjudicial interpretation of the 1976 Act, see supra notes
127-180 and accompanying text.
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A. Early Copyright Legislation
Copyright protection for the public performance of musical
works derives from Article I of the United States Constitution,
which authorizes Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "47
Despite this grant, during the late eighteenth century and most of
the nineteenth century, musical copyright owners neither possessed
nor desired to possess the right to control public performance of
their musical works. 48 The first copyright legislation, passed in
1790, limited protection to books, charts and maps, but did not pro-
tect public communications of their contents. 49 As technological
advances catapulted the United States into the industrial revolution
and the era of mass production, Congress responded to changing
copyright needs and gradually extended the protection of Article I
to cover other art forms including photographs, sculptures, written
musical compositions and public performance of dramatic works.50
47. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 481 (repealed 1870). This Act
conferred upon musical copyright owners the right to control public performance
of their works. See id. However, copyright owners were reluctant to enforce their
public performance rights because they feared that doing so would suppress sheet
music sales. See Bernard Korman, Perfomrance Rights in Music Under Sections 110 and
118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 521, 523-24 (1977). In addition
copyright owners may have lacked effective enforcement mechanisms until ASCAP
was formed in 1914. SeeJohn M. Kernochan, Music Peiforiming Rights Organizations
in the United States of America: Special Characteristics, Restraints, and Public Attitudes, 10
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 333, 336 (1986).
49. SeeAct of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). Under the act,
"the author.., of any map, chart.., or books printed within these United States
... shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending ... for the term of fourteen years from the recording of title thereof in
the clerk's office .... " Id.
50. See Susan. A. Maslow, Comment, "Watts" the Perimeter of the Doctrine of the
Communication of a Radio Broadcast Under Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act?, 55
TEMP. L.Q. 1056, 1061-63 nn. 24-29 (1982). A constant "state of flux" surrounds
copyright protection because of the intangible nature of copyright property and
the evolution of new sources of creation, production and distribution. Id. at 1061-
62; see generally Bernard A. Grossman, Cycles in Copyright, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 653
(1977) (identifying historical patterns in copyright law development).
Almost 12 years after the 1790 Act, Congress extended copyright protection to
"arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints." Act of Apr.
29, 1802, ch.36, 2 Stat. 171, 171-72 (repealed 1831). With the repeal of the 1790
and 1802 Acts, Congress further broadened copyright protection to include musi-
cal compositions. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870). This
right lost value due to the rise of the player piano and phonograph because
neither machine's operation fit within the ambit of existing copyright legislation.
See Robert S. Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law, 5 W.
NEw ENG. L. Rv. 203, 205 (1982). Dramatic performances gained protection in
1856. SeeAct of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1870). In 1865,
[Vol. 4: p. 147
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Finally, in 1897, Congress put musical compositions on an equal
footing with dramatic composition 51 and expanded copyright pro-
tection to include public performance of musical works.5 2
Responding to fears that the 1897 Act overextended copyright
protection, the 1909 Congress added a "for profit" limitation to the
musical copyright owner's right to control public performance. 53
Under this new 1909 Act, copyright owners gained the right to re-
ceive compensation for their work's public performance if they
proved three elements: first, the infringer "performed" the copy-
right owner's work; second, the infringer performed publicly; and
finally, the infringer publicly performed the work "for profit."
54
Congress added photographs and negatives to the protected list. See Act of Mar. 3,
1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (repealed 1870). Five years later, in 1870, Congress
extended copyright protection to paintings, drawings, chromos, statuettes, statu-
ary, models and designs intended to be perfected as works of fine art. See Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 86, 100, 16 Stat. 198, 212, 214 (repealed 1909).
The Supreme Court recognized an artist's assignable right to control the use
of his or her private works in 1834. SeeWheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,660
(1834). However, the Court denied the plaintiff recovery because the private work
had already been publicly disseminated. See id. at 677.
51. See White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 16 (1907) (stating that
Congress sought to put dramatic composition and musical composition on equal
ground).
52. SeeAct ofJan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Star. 481 (repealed 1909). Under this Act,
any "person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical composi-
tion for which a copyright has been obtained, without consent of the proprietor of
said dramatic or musical composition .... shall be liable for damages .... " Id. at
481-82. Despite this grant, musical copyright owners were slow to enforce their
rights to control public performance of their works. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 787-
88. During the 19th century, sheet music royalties represented a musical copyright
owner's primary income source. See id. at 788. Therefore, even after the Jan. 6,
1897 Act, musical copyright owners declined to enforce public performance rights
because they feared that doing so might suppress sheet music sales. See id.; see also
Korman, supra note 48, at 523-24 (explaining historical development of musical
copyright).
53. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, amended by Act ofJuly 30,
1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976))(re-
pealed 1987). The 1909 Act consolidated all major federal copyright statutes into
a single title subdivided into eleven categories. See id.
54. Id.; see also Paul Warenski, Copyrights and Background Music: Unplug the Ra-
dio Before I Infringe Again, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 523, 525 (1993) (explain-
ing 1909 Act); David E. Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill:
Recent Developments in Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29 ARiz. L.
Rxv. 475, 477-83 (1987) (same).
The 1909 Act provided in pertinent part:
That any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of
this Act, shall have the exclusive right:
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition; and for the purpose of public performance for profit, and
for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof, to make any arrange-
ment or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or
9
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Although Congress clearly intended the Act to protect public per-
formances where a business owner charged patrons a direct fee to
hear the performance, it left the courts with the more difficult task
of deciding whether the Act protected incidental public perform-
ances where a business owner charged no fee but provided music
for background purposes. 55
B. Case Law Under the 1909 Act
In a series of decisions that spanned sixty years, federal courts
attempted to develop rules to govern copyright protection for inci-
dental performances in commercial settings. The conflicting deci-
sions and enduring confusion with which the judiciary grappled
precipitated further amendment to the slowly developing copyright
act.
Within ten years after Congress passed the 1909 Act, the
Supreme Court announced in Herbert v. Shanely Co.5 6 that live per-
formances of copyrighted music performed in a restaurant fell
within the ambit of the 1909 Act's public performance "for profit"
any form of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded
and from which it may be read or reproduced ....
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e) (1976)).
Under the 1909 Act, artists who sought copyright protections registered their
original composition and thereby gained the exclusive rights to both copy and
publicly perform the registered work. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1(a),(e)(1976)). An artist who filed notice of the
first authorized recording of the work could enjoin unauthorized, for profit public
performances. See id. Those who desired to record different versions of the work
could do so after paying the work's creator a compulsory license fee. See id.
Unlike patent law, which generally recognizes a work as original only if it is
unique, for a work to be original under copyright law, it need only result from the
artist's independent creative effort or individuality of expression. See Hoague-
Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (compar-
ing patent and copyright laws and stating that under copyright laws "original" work
need only originate from author); see also Smith v. George E. Muelenbach Brewing
Co., 140 F. Supp. 729, 731 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (holding that original music composi-
tion results from consideration of both words and music as unit; and that material
added to public domain must have aspects of novelty and must be something more
than trivial addition or variation); Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib.
Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (finding copyright infringement exists
where artist creates original rhythm, harmony or melody).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 (1909). The 1909 Act prohibited unauthorized
performances in cabarets, theaters, concert halls and other places charging a fee
for admission to hear music. See id.; see also Muedini, 55 F.3d at 267 (framing issue
as follows: whether restaurant owner infringes copyright when he plays incidental
background music in restaurant over single receiving apparatus with nine
speakers).
56. 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
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doctrine. 57 Applying the 1909 Act's "for profit" language, the
Supreme Court prohibited a restaurant's unauthorized use of copy-
righted music played by a live orchestra, even though the proprie-
tor charged the patrons no admission fee to hear the music. 58
Justice Holmes reasoned that, although the restaurant declined to
charge patrons directly, the patrons ultimately bore the perform-
ance costs through increased prices for other services.5 9
Herbert represents the first in a series of decisions that con-
strued the 1909 Act in the copyright owners' favor and imposed
liability on unauthorized users. 60 Later, federal courts held that
radio broadcasting stations performed both "publicly" and "for
profit" although audience members could listen for free from geo-
graphically distinct locations. 61 In 1929, the Fifth Circuit held that
57. In Herbert, a restaurant owner employed an orchestra to play background
music in his restaurant. Id. at 594. Victor Herbert's suit against the hotel for unau-
thorized performances of the song "Sweethearts" failed in both lower courts, but
was unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court. See Herbert v. Shanley Co., 222
Fed. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), affd, 229 Fed. 340 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
On appeal, the Supreme Court consolidated a companion case where John Phil-
lips Sousa's publisher sued the Vanderbilt Hotel for similar infringing perform-
ances. See Herbert, 242 U.S. at 591; Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg,
Performing Rights in Music and Performing Rights Societies, in 9 PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADrmACs AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES PLI/PAT 16 (Prac-
ricing Law Institute, 1987).
58. See Herbert, 242 U.S. at 594.
59. See id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the restaurant owner lacked any
reason for employing the orchestra other than increasing revenues. See id. at 595.
Following that logic, Justice Holmes wrote for the majority that although the
owner charged no direct fee, the increased revenue that the owner received from
employing the orchestra characterized the arrangement as "for profit," bringing
the performances within the 1909 Act's scope. Id. He stated:
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance
where money is taken at the door they are very imperfectly protected.
Performances not different in kind from those of the defendants could
be given that might compete with and even destroy the success of the
monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say
that there is no need to construe the statute so narrowly. The defend-
ants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a total for
which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attrib-
uted to a particular item which those present are expected to order, is
not important. It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither
is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object
is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited powers of con-
versation, or disliking rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be had
from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay it would be given up. If it pays
it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of employing
it is profit, and that is enough.
Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
60. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 17.
61. SeeJerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories, Co., 5
F.2d 411 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925); M. Witmark and Sons v. L.
Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D.N.J. 1923). In Jerome H. Remick, a radio station
11
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a commercial user publicly performed copyrighted music for profit
when he played a record on a phonograph. 62
Two decades passed after the 1909 Act's enactment before a
case determined whether a business violated copyright protections
where it used radio broadcasts which contained copyrighted music
to provide background music. 63 In 1931 the Supreme Court re-
viewed this controversy in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.64 There,
the Supreme Court, per Justice Brandeis, extended 1909 Act
liability to a hotel owner who played radio broadcasts through
speakers installed throughout his hotel.65 With Jewell-LaSalle, no
broadcasted a live musical performance without the musical copyright owner's per-
mission. Jerome H. Remick, 5 F.2d at 411. The court reasoned that a performance
could be "public" within the meaning of the 1909 Act regardless of whether the
audience gathered in a stadium or listened in isolation from within their homes.
Id. at 412. According to the circuit court, radio allowed for the widest audience of
any medium during that time. See id. While these cases established liability for
primary users, like radio stations, they failed to determine the liability for secon-
dary users, like the receivers of the broadcast and the stations' listeners. See Cass
County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1995) (addressing secon-
dary user liability).
In M. Witmark, a radio broadcaster used an announcement reciting: "L. Bam-
berger & Co., One of America's Great Stores, Newark, N.J." at the beginning and
end of a radio program broadcast. M. Witmark 291 Fed. at 779. The district court
found unpersuasive the defendant's argument that the copyright owners benefit-
ted because the user promoted the music broadcast. See id. The court stated that
by granting the right of public performance to the copyright owner, Congress in-
tended that the copyright owner have the right to control the method of promo-
tion through public performance. See id.
62. See Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1929). "The
provision conferring... the exclusive right of publicly performing for profit con-
tains nothing which can be given the effect of excepting a public performance for
profit by means of a phonograph record." Id.
63. See Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929). In Buck a Missouri
district court held that a business owner violated copyright protections where he
used radio broadcasts which contained copyrighted music to provide background
music for his business. Id.
64. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
65. See id. The hotel proprietor connected speakers in both public and pri-
vate areas to one central receiver and offered loud-speakers or headphones to
guests. See id. at 195. The receiver transmitted radio broadcasts from a local sta-
tion through all the speakers and head-phones in the hotel. See id. Interestingly,
the radio station continued to broadcast unauthorized copyrighted music despite
the copyright owners efforts to obtain a fee. See id. As a result, the copyright
owner brought suit against the radio station and the hotel proprietor. See id.
Although the district court entered default judgment against the radio station, the
plaintiffs continued their suit against the hotel. See id.
The circuit court certified the issue to the Supreme Court using the following
language:
Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests,
through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loudspeakers in-
stalled in his hotel and under his control and for the entertaining of his
guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical composition... constitute a
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longer would a single rendition of a copyrighted work result in only
one performance. 66 The notion that a single rendition could be
simultaneously performed- performed by an initial source (i.e.,
radio station) and also performed in a public place via a receiving
apparatus (i.e., the hotel owners receiver and speaker system)-be-
came known as the "multiple performance doctrine."6 7 The Jewel-
LaSalle decision not only extended the 1909 Act's prohibitions to an
entirely new class of music receivers, but also acted as a windfall for
both copyright owners and performing rights societies. 68 This
windfall lasted more than thirty years.69 As courts continued the
Herbert pattern of interpreting the 1909 Act to impose liability on
users, the class of users from which copyright owners and perform-
ing rights societies could collect fees drastically expanded from the
performance of such composition within the meaning of 17 U.S.C.
§ I(e)?
Id. at 195-96.
66. In the Jewell-LaSalle situation, where a radio station plays a record and
transmits this performance via radio waves, at least two performances occur: 1)
when the record is played in the station and converted into radio waves; and 2)
where a receiver and speaker convert radio waves into audible sounds. SeeJewell-
LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 199 n.5, 200-01; Maslow, supra note 50, at 1067 n.49.
67. The Supreme Court drew the following analogy to underscore the multi-
ple performance idea:
The transmitted radio waves require a receiving set for their detection
and translation into audible sound waves, just as the record requires an-
other mechanism for the reproduction of the recorded composition. In
neither case is the original program heard; and, in the former, compli-
cated electrical instrumentalities are necessary for its adequate reception
and distribution. Reproduction in both cases amounts to a peformance.
Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 200-01 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of the
multiple performance doctrine, see Wilk, supra note 5, at 790; see also Robert Cash,
Comment, Sailor Music: Exposing Gaps in 17 U.S. C. § 110(5), 9 RUrGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 133, 137 (1982) (explaining that where public performance occurs via
radio and is publicly retransmitted for profit and without authorization, copyright
protection inheres).
68. For a discussion of how subsequent decisions applied and expanded the
1909 Act's coverage against users, see infra note 71. ASCAP and copyright owners
in general sought to capitalize on the Jewell-LaSalle ruling. See Society of European
Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1937)(underscoring copyright owner's argument that business'
unauthorized retransmission of licensed radio broadcast constituted infringing for
profit public performance).
During the thirty years following the Jewell-LaSalle decision, ASCAP thwarted
much potential litigation by amending its standard broadcast licensing agreement
to include a provision prohibiting the license from running in favor of any other
users (i.e., receivers of the broadcasts). See Shipley, supra note 54, at 481. The
Jevell-LaSalle holding served as the basis for ASCAP's licensing of commercial estab-
lishments which used radio broadcasts over loudspeakers. See id. at 481 n.39. How-
ever, ASCAP declined to assert its licensing rights against small "Mom and Pop"
establishments that used only small home type radios and no detached loudspeak-
ers. See id. (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975)).
69. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 16.
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primary public performers (i.e., radio stations and business owners
who hired orchestras or publicly played phonographs) 70 to secon-
dary performers (i.e., business owners who publicly played radio
broadcasts).71 Although users attempted creative defenses,72
courts remained unpersuaded and routinely upheld copyright own-
ers' claims for infringing performances. 73
70. For a discussion of judicial interpretations of these factual situations, see
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
71. One commentator suggests that after Jewel-LaSalle, anyone who played a
radio in public for commercial advantage ran the risk of violating copyright law
unless they obtained a license from the copyright owners. See Shipley, supra note
54, at 481. This statement seems correct in light of the many subsequent decisions
which continued to construe the 1909 Act in favor of copyright owners. In 1944,
the Second Circuit held that a radio station infringed an owner's copyright and
"publicly performed for profit" even where a non-profit organization owned and
operated the station. Associated Music Publishers Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio
Fund, 141 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944). More often
than not in the case of private night clubs that maintained minimal admissions
standards, courts favored the copyright owners and held that the clubs "performed
publicly." Lerner v. Club Wander In, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 731 (D. Mass. 1959); see
also M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 (D.
Mass. 1960) (holding that club orchestra publicly performed for profit where club
maintained open admission to most citizens over 21 years of age); but see Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt, 21 C.O. BULL. 203 (D. Md. 1932) (denying
plaintiffs copyright infringement claim).
At least one court applied joint and several liability to the emerging technol-
ogy of background music services and their subscribers where the service supplied
the music and the subscriber publicly broadcast the music. See Harms, Inc. v. San-
som House Enterprises, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958), affd per curiam sub
nom. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc. 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959).
The issue of whether performances violated copyright protections where they
were rendered by mechanical means, rather than by live musicians, arose once
again in the mid 1960s. See Chappell & Co. v. Middletown Farmers Market &
Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1964).
72. Some users argued that copyright owners who sold sheet music impliedly
consented to public performance of the copyrighted music. See Interstate Hotel
Co. of Neb. v. Remick Music Corp., 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946); Irving Berlin, Inc.
v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa.
1922). Other business owners argued that sole liability rested with the musicians
who performed the music under an independent contractor theory. See Keca Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Chess Music,
Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 1977); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin,
47 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. La. 1942).
In Veltin, a tavern owner failed to avoid liability even though he posted signs
within his tavern and specifically instructed the band not to play certain musical
selections. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. at 648-49.
73. See supra notes 71-72. However, in its unanimous holding, the Court in
Jewell-LaSalle never expressed whether it would have allowed the hotel's rebroad-
cast if the copyright owner authorized the radio station to broadcast the work.
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931). In dicta citing the lower court's
decision, the Court acknowledged that a distinction between authorized and unau-
thorized broadcast might influence future decisions. See id. at 199 n.5 (citing Buck
v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929)). The district court created an implied
license in a cafe owner who installed a radio and broadcast ASCAP licensed radio
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By the 1960s, increasingly frequent technological advances
placed severe stress on the copyright protections of the 1909 Act
and raised serious questions about the Act's application to novel
technologies. 74 Three cases decided between 1968 and 1975, 75
forced the Supreme Court to revisit and revise its 1909 Act pro-
copyright owner position.76 In these cases, attempts to apply the
"performance" language of the 1909 Act to community antenna
television systems (CATV) 77 and developing audio technologies
broadcasts. Debaum, 40 F.2d at 735. The district court explained that when a copy-
right owner licenses music to a radio station, the owner impliedly consents to re-
sulting commercial distribution. See id. at 736. However, the district court's
decision failed to characterize the cafe owner's broadcast as a public performance.
See id. at 735; see also Mark H. Puffer, The Supreme Court and Copyright Liability for
Retransmissions of TV and Radio Signals: A Dubious Performance, 26 ASCAP CORIGrr
L. Symp. 127, 132 nn.24 & 25 (1981)(construing Debaum).
The Supreme Court arguably recognized that an implied license could exist if
the copyright owner issued consent to a radio station with knowledge that com-
mercial businesses received and retransmitted the station's broadcasts of the copy-
right owner's work. See Maslow, supra note 50, at 1067-68. ASCAP often nullifies
this sublicense possibility by inserting a clause expressly prohibiting the license
from running in favor of subsequent radio receivers. See Letter from Richard H.
Reimer, Director of Legal Affairs and Managing Attorney, ASCAP, to James B.
MacDonald, Editor of Student Works, Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law
Journal 21 (Sept. 19, 1996) (on file with Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Jour-
nal) (explaining that ASCAP licenses are negotiated with broadcasters and that
such exclusions are often inserted at broadcasters insistence). An economic bene-
fit inures to broadcasters who opt for this exclusion because they pay only for their
own broadcasts; and not for any implied sublicense in favor of subsequent receiv-
ers of the broadcasts. See id.
74. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 791-93. Congress attempted revision efforts on
the 1909 Act during the 1920s. See I. Fred Koenigsberg, The 1976 Copyright Act:
Advances for the Creator, in 9 PATENTS, COPYRuGHTs, TRADEMARKs AND LrrERARY PROP-
ERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES PLI/PAT 1 (Practicing Law Institute, 1987). These
attempts proved unsuccessful and ultimately stalled altogether with the advent of
the Second World War. See id. Following the war, the United States directed its
copyright energy toward perfecting an international copyright treaty. See id. These
efforts eventually produced the 1976 Act. See id. at 6.
75. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975); Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1973); Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
76. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 18.
77. "A CATV system consists... of a central antenna which receives and am-
plifies television signals and a network of cable through which the signals are then
transmitted to the receiving sets of individual subscribers, who thereby get better
reception and more [TV] channels to choose from." Copyright Law Revision: Hear-
ings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831 and 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1965) [hereinafter "1965 Hear-
ings"] (excerpting statement of George D. Cary. Deputy Register of Copyrights,
May 26, 1965).
Available in rural areas after World War II, CATV improved otherwise poor
reception. See id. at 45. Although CATV initially attracted few subscribers, by the
late 1960s, the central antenna technology grew into a prosperous industry whose
annual revenues exceeded $100 million. See id. at 35.
15
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proved unsuccessful. 78 In the first two decisions, Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc. 79 and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS,80 the ma-
jority refused to apply the Jewell-LaSalle doctrine to retransmissions
of copyrighted television programs by CATV operators.81 In Fort-
nightly, the Supreme Court divided users into two classes: (1) broad-
casters, who performed; and (2) viewers, who did not perform.82
Since the Court determined that CATV operators fell under the
nonperforming class, the 1909 Act's public performance prohibi-
tions did not apply to their use of copyrighted materials.8 3
The Supreme Court's later decision in Teleprompter reaffirmed Fort-
nightly, and held that the public performance prohibitions did not
apply to CATV operators even where a great distance separated the
broadcasting station and the viewer. 84 In Fortnightly, the Supreme
78. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 18.
79. 392 U.S. 390, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 902 (1968).
80. 415 U.S. 394 (1973).
81. For a discussion of Fortnightly and Teleprompter, see infra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
82. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392. In Fortnightly, a CATV operator retransmitted
programming from five television broadcast stations. Id. Copyright owners sued
the CATV operator after it retransmitted programming containing certain motion
pictures without a license. See id. Some of the licensing agreements between the
copyright owners and the television broadcast stations expressly prohibited the li-
cense from running in favor of broadcast receivers like the CATV operator. See id.
In overturning the lower court rulings, the Supreme Court, per justice Stewart,
avoided the lower court findings of an implied sublicense, and instead held that no
"performance" occurred. Id. at 398; see United Artist Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly,
255 F. Supp. 177, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 377 F.2d 872, 880 (2d Cir. 1967).
Justice Stewart defined a narrow line between the users that perform and those
that do not perform, writing, "[b]roadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform."
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399.
83. See id. For the court, Justice Stewart concluded that CATV did not broad-
cast and fit better within the "viewer" class than the "broadcaster" class. Id. There-
fore, if CATV operators did not broadcast, they did not perform and could not be
liable under the 1909 Act. See id.
84. In Teleprompter, Teleprompter Corporation retransmitted various unau-
thorized CBS broadcasts via CATV. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 396. CBS sued for
copyright infringement. See id. at 396-97. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent
Fortnightly decision for its dismissal, the district court held that Teleprompter
merely retransmitted the signals but did not render any performance within the
meaning of the 1909 Act. See id. at 398. While the Second Circuit affirmed the
retransmission finding, it reversed the dismissal on a new theory that Tele-
prompter received distant and otherwise nonreceivable signals rather than local
signals from the broadcasting stations. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1973). In reversing the circuit
court, the Supreme Court held that a CATV operator "does not lose its status as a
nonbroadcaster and thus a 'nonperformer' for copyright purposes, when the sig-
nals it carries are from distant rather than local sources." Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at
409. To lay the CATV issue to rest the court stated:
When a television broadcaster transmits a program, it has made public
for simultaneous viewing and hearing, the contents of that program. The
privilege of receiving the broadcast electronic signals and converting
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Court briefly distinguished Jewell-LaSalle on its facts, while the Tele-
prompter decision completely avoided any reference to the thirty
year-old precedent.85
The Supreme Court's decision in Twentieth Century Music v.
Aiken86 addressed a radio-over-loudspeaker use of copyrighted mu-
sic that appeared similar to the use in Jewell-LaSalle.87 In Aiken,
George Aiken played radio broadcasts in a small Pittsburgh fast
food restaurant via a receiver and four ceiling mounted speakers. 8
Since Aiken never obtained a license, the plaintiff copyright owners
sued him and alleged that his reception and playing of the broad-
casts constituted a "performance" within the meaning of the 1909
Act and therefore infringed upon the copyright holders' exclusive
right to publicly perform their copyrighted works for profit.89
Relying on both the Fortnightly and the Teleprompter decisions,
the Supreme Court in Aiken dealt a critical blow to the Jewell-LaSalle
doctrine when it held that Aiken's conduct did not constitute a
"performance" within the meaning of the 1909 Act.90 Given the
small scale of Aiken's restaurant, the Supreme Court reasoned that
a rule finding infringement on the Aiken facts would ultimately be-
come unenforceable because of the large number of businesses
them into the sights and sounds of the program inheres in all members
of the public who have the means of doing so. The reception and
rechanelling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is essentially a
viewer function, irrespective of the distance between the broadcasting sta-
tion and the ultimate viewer.
Id. at 408; see also Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199 n.5
(1931) (suggesting that copyright owners impliedly sanctioned any radio reception
over public airwaves); Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1929) (explain-
ing that copyright owner impliedly acquiesced to commercial reception and re-
transmission and could more fully protect himself through refusing to licence his
works to radio station capable of public broadcast to commercial establishments).
85. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392. Distinguishing Fortnightly from Jewell-LaSalle,
the majority explained that the 1931 case may have been decided differently had
the Jewell-LaSalle copyright holder authorized the original transmitter, the radio
station, to broadcast the music. Id. at 397 n.18 (citing Buck v.Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931)).
86. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
87. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 18.
88. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 152. Aiken received unedited broadcasts including
news and advertisements from a radio station which possessed a license from AS-
CAP to broadcast music, but the station's license contained the provision prevent-
ing the license from running in favor of subsequent receivers. See id. at 153.
89. Id. at 157. The Supreme Court assumed that Aiken's acts fit with the
"publicly" and "for profit" elements. Id.
90. Id. at 161.
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with radio and television sets.9 1 From a technological perspective,
analogizing Fortnightly and Teleprompter to Aiken's situation, the
Supreme Court explained that if sophisticated CATV retransmis-
sion was not a "performance" within the 1909 Act's meaning, then
Aiken's use of his relatively primitive radio could not qualify as a
performance. 92
Taken together, these three cases virtually overruled the Jewell-
LaSalle court's decision. 93 In Fortnightly, Teleprompter and Aiken, the
Supreme Court suggested that only a single performance occurred
when CATV operators or small businesses used broadcast copy-
righted works.9 4 Moreover, the Aiken court clearly eviscerated the
multiple performance doctrine from small businesses when it de-
cided that a small business establishment does not perform musical
copyrighted works when it plays the radio publicly and for profit.9 5
By urging Congress in Fortnightly, Teleprompter and Aiken to enact
new legislation to keep stride with advancing technologies the
Supreme Court evinced the attitude that the 1909 Act had
become hopelessly outdated.96 Less than two years later, Congress
responded. 9 7
91. Id. at 162. The Supreme Court noted that an infringement holding
would, "authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is basically a
single public rendition of a copyrighted work." Id. at 162-63.
92. Id.; see also Warenski, supra note 54, at 526 (explaining holding of Aiken).
93. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 19.
94. See id.
95. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 795. Observing that copyright owners already
received "adequate" royalties from broadcasters based on listener popularity, the
Supreme Court feared that "multiple tribute" would result in a windfall for copy-
right owners. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that blanket licenses
fail to fully protect small business owners who have no way of knowing whether a
particular song is within ASCAP's or BMI's repertoire. Compare Aiken, 422 U.S. at
162 (stating "a person in Aiken's position would have no sure way of protecting
himself from liability for copyright infringement except by keeping his radio set
turned off.") with Wilk, supra note 5 (stating that, by the mid-1970s the repertories
of ASCAP and BMI ran into millions and contained almost every domestic copy-
righted musical composition in existence). Although the Supreme Court distin-
guished Jewell-LaSalle on the grounds that the Jewell-LaSalle radio station was not
licensed, Aiken effectively overruled Jewell-LaSalle since the existence of an unli-
censed broadcaster is highly unlikely in modern times. See Wilk, supra note 5, at
795-96.
96. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 57, at 19 (citing Fortnightly Corp.
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 404, 408 (1968)); Twentieth Cen-
tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 166, 167-68, 170 (1975); Teleprompter
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 414, 421-22 (1974).
97. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-120 (1994).
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C. Copyright Act Revision: Introducing the "Home-Style
Exemption" in the 1976 Copyright Act
On October 19, 1976, Congress attempted to end the confu-
sion surrounding the Jewell La-Salle precedent and enacted the Gen-
eral Revision of Copyright Law of 1976.98 Under section 106 of the
1976 Act, Congress broadened the types of uses that required a
copyright owner's consent.99 Congress also granted musical copy-
right owners the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work
publicly."100 Moreover, Congress codified the Jewell La-Salle defini-
tion of "perform." Under the 1976 Act, a user "performs" a musical
work when the user, "directly or by means of any device or process,"
renders, recites or plays the work.10 1 The Act added the definition
of "publicly" to mean a place open to the public or any place where
a substantial number of persons gather, outside of a normal circle
of family and social acquaintances. 10 2 Joining these two definitions
together, to publicly perform a work under the 1976 Act's lan-
guage, a user must simply communicate the work to the public by
any process or device. 10 3 To temper the broad copyright protection
of section 106, sections 107 through 120 carve out certain specific
98. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-20 (effectiveJan. 1, 1978)).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). Section 106 gives a copyright owner five catego-
ries of exclusive rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending; ...
(4) in the case of... musical .... works... to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(5) in the case of... musical... works, to display the copyrighted work
publicly.
Id.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The 1976 Act provides copyright owners with a vari-
ety of remedies to enforce their ownership rights against unauthorized users. 17
U.S.C. § 504(c) (1)-(2) (1994) (describing available statutory damages); see, e.g., Cass
County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 1996 WL 376424 at *3 (8th Cir. Jul. 8,
1996) (discussing statutory damages and propriety of jury trials for infringement
suits).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
102. Id.
103. See id. The 1976 Act states that to publicly perform a work means:
[T]o transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to . . . the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
at different times.
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limitations on the copyright owner's exclusive rights to control use
of the work.10 4
One of these narrow restrictions, section 110(5), exempts a
small business establishment from copyright liability where it plays
radio or television broadcasts on a "single receiving apparatus of a
type commonly used in private homes." 10 5 Specifically, this exemp-
tion, called the "home-style exemption," provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the follow-
ing are not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a per-
formance or display of a work by the public recep-
104. SeeWilk supra note 5, at 797 n.83 (citing limitations on copyright owners'
exclusive rights in: section 107 (addressing fair use); section 108 (discussing repro-
duction by libraries and archives); section 109 (explaining effect of transfer of par-
ticular copy or phonorecord); section 110 (describing exemption of certain
performances or displays); section 111 (detailing secondary transmissions); section
112 (addressing ephemeral recordings); section 113 (discussing scope of exclusive
rights in pictorial, graphic and sculptural works); section 114 (explaining scope of
exclusive rights in sound recordings); section 115 (addressing scope of exclusive
rights in nondramatic musical works; compulsory license for making and distribut-
ing phonorecords); section 116 (describing scope of exclusive rights: compulsory
licenses for public performances by means of coin operated phonorecord players);
section 117 (addressing computer programs); section 118 (detailing scope of ex-
clusive rights; use of certain works in connection with noncommercial broadcast-
ing); section 119 (describing limitations on exclusive rights; secondary
transmissions of superstations and network stations for private home viewing); sec-
tion 120 (addressing scope of exclusive rights in architectural works)). For a dis-
cussion of whether these rights are natural or artificial, see Gary Kauffman, Exposing
the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 381 (1986).
105. Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995).
Section 110 contains other narrowly tailored exemptions. For example, section
110(1) exempts performances rendered in "a classroom or similar place devoted
to instruction...." 17 U.S.C. § 110(1). Section 110(2) provides an exemption for
nonprofit instructional performances occurring during the course of radio or tele-
vision broadcasts. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2). Section 110(3) includes an exemption for
performances of "sacred" works in places of "religious assembly" during "the
course of services." 17 U.S.C. § 110(3). Section 110(4) provides a limited exemp-
tion for certain performances by nonprofit organizations if the performances are
not broadcast publicly via radio, television, etc. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4). Section
110(6) provides an exemption from vicarious liability for government bodies and
nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organizations who sponsor exhibitions at
which individual vendors render performances. 17 U.S.C. § 110(6). Section
110(7) provides an exemption to owners of vending establishments who perform
copyrighted works solely to promote sales of those copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(7). Sections 110(8) and 110(9) exempt certain performances directed at
certain handicapped groups. 17 U.S.C. § 110(8), (9). Section 110(10) specifically
exempts certain performances by nonprofit fraternal and veterans organizations
like "Elks, Kiwanis, Shriners. .. ." 17 U.S.C. § 110(10); see 128 CONG. REc. S13155
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (Sen. Strom Thurmond).
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tion of the transmission on a single receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes, unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the trans-
mission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further trans-
mitted to the public.10 6
The basic rationale behind exempting performances by means of a
receiving apparatus commonly used in private homes is that these
performances pose such a minimal threat to copyright owners that
no liability should extend to users. 10 7 Before users qualify for the
home-style exemption that section 110(5) provides, they must meet
three requirements. First, they must use a "single receiving appara-
tus of a kind commonly used in private homes."10 8 Second, the
users must not charge a direct admission to hear or see the trans-
mission. 10 9 Third, they must not further transmit the broadcast to
the public. 110
Congress intended the first requirement, that the device used
must be a "single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in
private homes,""' to apply to situations where a user publicly
played music or television broadcasts over an ordinary receiving sys-
tem commonly sold for in-home use (a "home-style" receiving
apparatus).1 2 In codifying section 110(5), Congress explicitly rein-
stated the pre-Aiken, Jewell-LaSalle rule stating that any commercially
public broadcast: (1) via non-home-type means; and (2) not fitting
with the other narrowly drawn exemptions,'" 3 infringes upon copy-
106. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5700. "[T] he secondary use of the transmission by turning on an ordinary
receiver in public is so remote and minimal that no further liability should be
imposed." Id. The report notes that at the time the legislature enacted the bill, no
one collected royalties in the vast majority of situations falling within the Aiken fact
pattern. See id.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
109. See id.
110. See id. To "transmit" a performance under the 1976 Act means to "com-
municate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received be-
yond the place from which they are sent." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (5).
112. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5700. "It applies to performances and displays of all types of works, and its pur-
pose is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns on, in a public
place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold
to members of the public for private use." Id.
113. See supra notes 101-04 for other exceptions.
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right protection.114 Without overruling Aiken in its entirety, Con-
gress characterized the facts of Aiken as the "outer limit" of this new
section 110(5) "home-style exemption." 115
Observing that the facts of Aiken, together with the brief word-
ing of section 110(5), provided inadequate guidance to courts
faced with applying the 1976 Act to new factual situations, the Con-
ference Committee adopted the House Report's legislative findings
as a further aid to courts faced with interpreting the new legisla-
114. See H.R. Rxp. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5701. Congress stated:
The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its decision on
a narrow construction of the word "perform" in the 1909 statute. This
basis for the decision is completely overturned by the present bill and its
broad definition of "perform".... The committee has adopted the lan-
guage of Section 110(5), with an amendment expressly denying
the exemption in situations where 'the performance or display is further
transmitted beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is lo-
cated' [sic]; in doing so, it accepts the traditional, pre-Aiken, interpretation of the
Jewell-LaSalle decision, under which public communication by means other
than a home receiving set, or further transmission of a broadcast to the
public, is considered an infringing act.
Id. (emphasis added). Note that the report purports to "completely overturn" the
Aiken court's definition of perform, but accepts the factual situation of Aiken as the
"outer limit" of exempted use. Id.
Unlike the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act included a definition for "perform" in Sec-
tion 101. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Jewell-LaSalleaddressed only the issue of whether a "per-
formance" occurred and created the multiple performance doctrine; the decision
did not focus on the nature of the receiving apparatus. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Re-
alty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). Thus, some commentators believe that whether or
not a home type receiver was used was irrelevant to the Jewell-LaSalle decision. See,
e.g., Wilk, supra note 5, at 800 n.93. Significantly, subsequent rulings that refer to
Jewell-LaSalle make no distinction between commercial and home type equipment.
See e.g., id.; Society of European Stage Authors and Composers v. New York Hotel
Statler Co., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (finding copyright infringement
where hotel company broadcast copyrighted music via two central receiving sets).
In 1974, a year before Aiken, the Senate passed a version of section 110(5) that
permitted small businesses including taverns and doctors offices to retransmit ra-
dio and television broadcasts over home style type equipment for incidental en-
tertainment. See S. 1361, 93d Cong. (1974); S. REP. No. 93-383, at 130 (1974).
After Aiken, the Senate offered a different response than the House, and stated
that the exemption would not apply to factual situations like that set forth in Aiken.
See 122 CONG. REc. S. 1546 (daily ed. 1976). However, the Conference Committee
met to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate Bills and adopted
the Senate's limited version of the exemption, but kept the House Report's state-
ment of intent. See Shipley, supra note 54, at 488. For a detailed discussion of the
bill's passage through both the House and the Senate, see id. at 487-89.
115. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5701. In the legislative history, Congress emphasized the crucial factual circum-
stances in Aiken. See id. The House Report characterizes Aiken's stereo as "a home
receiver with four ordinary loudspeakers grouped within a relatively narrow cir-
cumference from the set. . . ." Id. The entire system was located within a "small
commercial establishment." Id. The report states, "this Committee considers this
fact situation to represent the outer limit of the exception, and believes the line
should be drawn at that point." Id.
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tion. 116 The House Report cautions against augmenting a home-
type apparatus, opining that "sophisticated or extensive amplifica-
tion equipment" shifts the sound system's status from an exempt
home-type apparatus into a non-exempt commercial-type sound sys-
tem. 117 Factors that influence whether a particular use involves a
home-type or commercial sound system include, "size, physical ar-
rangement, and noise level of areas within the establishment where
the transmissions are made audible or visible, and the extent to
which the receiving apparatus is altered or augmented" to improve
transmission quality for the audience. 118 Whether the business is
"of sufficient size tojustify... a subscription to a commercial back-
ground music service" 119 should also influence whether the exemp-
tion applies. 120
116. See Shipley, supra note 54, at 488. The House Report stated that a busi-
ness like Aiken's enjoyed exemption because: (1) Aiken "merely augmented an
ordinary home type receiver;" and (2) Aiken's small business did not "justify sub-
scribing to a commercial background music service." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701).
117. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5701.
118. Id.
119. Id. Background music services customarily provide re-recorded versions
of popular songs produced for commercial-free music programming. See Wilk,
supra note 5, at 815 n.151. MUZAK, Inc. and AEI, represent the largest providers
of these services. See id. (citing Jeanne McDermott, If it's to Be Heard but Not Listened
to, it must Be Muzak, SMrrIsoNw . , Jan. 1990, at 70). "Depending on the program-
ming package selected, the service is made available to customers through scram-
bled radio broadcasts, special long-playing tapes, and satellite broadcasts." Id.
(citing MUZAK SOUND & COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (1990)). The services provide
brand name publicly available equipment, and each format requires special equip-
ment to receive the broadcasts or play the tapes. See id. As an example of the type
of system commonly used by small business subscribers, AEI provides an integrated
tape deck-amplifier rated at 10 watts. See id. at 806 n.110. MUZAK and AEI market
their services on claims that the scientifically formulated programming will create
an atmosphere conducive to worker productivity and increased consumer activity.
See id. at 816-17 n.151.
As an indication of the cost of such subscriptions, in 1991 service providers
charged from $510 (MUZAK) to $600 for a 1,500 square foot business (similar to
Port Town Restaurant). See id. at 818 n.158. These costs probably included equip-
ment rental. See id.
120. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1733, at 75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5816. Like the House Report, the Conference Committee Report uses Aiken as an
example of a business that lacked sufficient size to justify a subscription to a com-
mercial background music service. See id. Interestingly, the report then states,
"[h]owever, where the public communication was by means of something other
than a home-type receiving apparatus, or where the establishment actually makes a
further transmission to the public, the exemption would not apply." Id. This pas-
sage reinforces the notion that despite other factors like the business's physical or
financial size, presence of either: (1) broadcast via a non-home-type receiver; or
(2) further public transmission, automatically negates the section 110(5) exemp-
tion. See id.
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Legislative history offers little explanation of the second and
third requirements, which prohibit both direct charges and further
transmissions.1 2 1  While Congress explicitly opted to qualify
the word "charge" with the adjective "direct,"122 Congress indicated
that it intended the amendment to restore the Jewell-LaSalle doc-
trine, under which liability attached if the proprietor received pecu-
niary benefit from the performance. 123 In addition, while the
definition in section 101 of "transmit" merely requires that a per-
formance be communicated to a receiving device beyond the place
from which the performance is rendered, Congress failed to de-
scribe the modified phrase in section 110(5), "further transmit,"
other than to adopt the pre-Aiken, Jewell-LaSalle interpretation. 124
Neither the Act's plain language nor its legislative history estab-
lishes any bright line rule apart from explicitly referring to the
Aiken facts as the exemption's outer limit.125 The utility of Aiken for
establishing a bright line rule, however, is limited because the Aiken
court had not discussed any of the factors that the legislature later
mentioned as additional considerations. 12 6
D. Judicial Interpretation of the 1976 Act
In light of the vague wording of both the statute and Congress'
intent, courts have experienced difficulties in applying the section
110(5) home-style exemption to fact patterns that differ from that
in Aiken. 127 Statutory ambiguities currently divide courts according
to two main methods of statutory construction. Some courts con-
121. See id. For a further description of the second and third requirements,
see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
123. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5701. "[In enacting the 1976 Act, Congress] accepts the traditional, pre-
Aiken, interpretation of the Jewell-LaSalle decision ...... Id. Congress advised that
the facts of Aiken represented the outer limit of the section 110(5) exemption, and
that any further receiver modification would be ineligible for the exemption. See
id.
124. Id. Although Congress never indicated that communication to separate
rooms was necessary, in Jewell-LaSalle the hotel proprietor ran speakers from a
central receiver into separated private rooms. For a discussion of the Jewell-Lasalle
facts, see supra notes 65-66.
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
126. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 801; H.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701. For a discussion of these other factors, see
supra note 114-17 and accompanying text.
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701; see also Shipley, supra note 54, at 499 (noting tortu-
ous history of exemption's legislative history and indicating lack of information
given to courts interpreting exemption); Wilk, supra note 5, at 801.
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strue the exemption strictly according to the statutory language and
merely require businesses to utilize a single receiving apparatus of a
kind commonly used in private homes without further transmitting
the received broadcast to the public. 12 8 Other courts place consid-
erable emphasis on an additional requirement not mentioned in
the statutory language - that the exempt business be a small com-
mercial establishment. 129
1. Statutory Elements
a. Receiving Apparatus of a Type Commonly Used in
Private Homes
Courts encounter difficulty interpreting the requirement in
section 110(5) that the user communicate the performance via "a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes."1 30 While some courts advocate viewing the entire system
and its use as a whole, other courts focus their reviews on particular
components.1 3 1 Although the courts that scrutinize individual com-
ponents fail to agree on which components indicate non-home-type
systems, 13 2 at least one decision indicates that the more powerful a
system's amplification equipment, the more it is likely that the sys-
tem will fall outside the home-style exemption.1 33
128. See Warenski, supra note 54, at 532; see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991)(applying strict statutory
construction to home-style exemption).
129. See Warenski, supra note 54, at 532; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701; H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 75 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5816; see, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v. Kowal-
czyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. 111. 1987), affd, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying
size as independently sufficient criterion for determining home-style exemption's
applicability).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5); seeWilk, supra note 5, at 802-05 (arguing that courts
often disqualify systems that would otherwise meet fact pattern of Aiken).
131. Compare Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1175
(W.D. Tex. 1988) (focusing on specific components like recessed ceiling speakers
and concealed wiring to find that system was not of type commonly used in private
homes), with Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont.
1990) (holding that rather than merely focusing on specific components, entire
system should be viewed in whole and considered in context of system's actual
use). For two recent decisions advocating the totality approach to sound system
review, see infra notes 156-81 and accompanying text.
132. Compare Merril, 688 F. Supp. at 1175 (finding ceiling recessed speakers,
wire length and concealment important factors), with Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd, 949 F.2d
1482 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding same factors insignificant if receiver itself is com-
monly used in private homes).
133. See International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 655 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (finding "Grommes" receiver with "paging capabilities and .. . three sets
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b. Further Transmission to the Public
Section 110(5) exempts radio broadcasts via a home-style re-
ceiving apparatus unless the user: (1) directly charges customers
who listen to the broadcasts; or (2) further transmits the broadcast
to the public. 3 4 The Act defines "transmit" as: "communicat[ing]
... by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received
beyond the place from which they are sent."l3 5 Courts and
commentators differ on how narrowly to construe the definition's
phrase, "beyond the place from which they are sent."13 6 Some
courts examine an establishment's physical size to determine
whether a further transmission to the public occurred.1 3 7 Under
this approach, the bigger the establishment's square footage, the
more likely it is that the user further transmits the broadcast. 3 8
Other courts construe the further transmission language more
strictly, holding that further transmission occurs when a signal runs
through speaker wire to speakers located in different rooms from
the receiver. 13 9
of speaker terminals: 8 ohms, 25 volts, and 70 volts... capable of driving up to 40
speakers," was not type commonly used in private homes).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
136. For example, under a narrow construction, any speaker-made sound
would be disqualified, since the speakers are located beyond the antenna (the
place where the transmission is initially received), and beyond the receiver. Fur-
thermore, any audible sound could be disqualified under the theory that a sound
must travel beyond the place where it is received in order to reach the eardrum.
See Wilk, supra note 5, at 807-08 (arguing that further transmission to public occurs
when those members of public outside confines of establishment are able to hear
performance). But cf Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding open air Putt-Putt course exempt).
137. See, e.g., Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
138. See id. (holding transmission occurred where establishments measure
2,769 square feet and 6,770 square feet). But see Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. at 1113
(holding no further transmission occurred despite use in 7,500 square foot open
air Putt-Putt course).
139. See, e.g., U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220,
1227 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that sound dispersal throughout restaurant consti-
tuted further transmission); Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031,
1038 (D. Mont. 1990) (holding similar definition of further transmission); Merrill
v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (stating
that further transmission occurs when speakers and receiver are located in differ-
ent rooms); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (holding receiver located in office and speakers dispersed through dining
room, coffee shop and bar allowed further transmission to public); Rodgers v.
Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 n.1, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (hold-
ing receiver located in office further publicly transmitted broadcasts to store
mounted speakers); but see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F.
Supp. 1324, 1331 (N.D. 111. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991)(rejecting
above view, stating, "every radio requires wiring"); see also Wilk, supra note 5, at 810-
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c. Physical and Financial Size: The Small Business Requirement
One of the first reported cases to address the home-style ex-
emption of section 110(5) considered the business' physical size as
a crucial factor.1 40 In Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc.,14 1 copyright
owners brought suit against two New York City Gap clothing stores
for playing background music via a receiver connected to several
recessed ceiling speakers. 142 Holding that the Gap was not the type
of small commercial business that Congress intended to exempt in
section 110(5), the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the copyright owners.' 4 3 In reaching its decision, the dis-
trict court not only relied upon the language in the statute, but
relied heavily upon the size guidelines set forth in the House Com-
mittee Report to find that the Gap's large stores facilitated further
transmission to the public. 4 4 Without reaching the issue of
whether the sound system was of a type commonly used in homes,
11 (attacking courts and commentator notions of further transmission for failing
to offer usable methods of application).
140. See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
141. Id.
142. Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923, 923-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The system in each store broadcast the background music audibly through-
out each entire store. See id. Far larger than the 620 square feet of store space in
Aiken, one Gap store measured 2,769 square feet and the other measured 6,770
square feet. See id. at 925.
143. See id. at 925. This decision suggests that the court did not read the
statutory language strictly, but understood the exemption as Congress's attempt to
protect small businesses.
144. See id. at 925 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(5); H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 87
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5701). In granting summaryjudgment
the district court held: 1) that the Gap converted its sound system into a commer-
cial type system; 2) that the two stores with an average size of 3500 square feet,
were of sufficient size to justify a subscription to a commercial background music
service; and 3) that the Gap further transmitted radio broadcasts to the public. See
id. The third holding fits neatly within the section 110(5) (B) prohibition against
further transmissions, while the first two holdings are not so clearly traceable to
section 110(5) language. See id.
Concerning the first holding, the district court found that the Gap augmented
its sound system with sophisticated amplification equipment. See id. The House
Report specifically mentioned that this conversion would effectively remove the
system from the home style exemption. SEE H.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
In reaching the second holding, the court stated, "[t]he Gap stores, with an
average size of 3,500 square feet, are substantially larger than the public area of
620 square feet in the fast-food store at issue in Aiken." Sailor Music, 516 F. Supp. at
925. Comparing these two square footage measurements, the court decided that
Gap's size removed it from the exemption. See id. (citing H.R1 REP. No. 94-1733, at
75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5816). The district court also used the
size factor to support its holding of a "further transmission to the public." Id. "By
virtue of the size of The Gap stores, the radio transmissions... are 'further trans-
mitted to the public.'" Id.
27
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the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and ex-
plained that Gap's size, which exceeded the 620 square foot outer
limit of Aiken, justified a background music service subscription. 145
The circuit court implicitly disagreed with Gap's argument that
"further transmission" could not be found where all the speakers
were located in the same place as the receiver.146 While physical
size proved an important factor in Sailor Music, the question re-
mained whether physical size independently enabled courts to
make a section 110(5) classification. 147
In 1988, the Seventh Circuit adopted the small business re-
quirement as an independent element that must be proven along
with the home-style receiving apparatus and the lack of further
transmission requirements. 148 On facts similar to Muedini,149 an Il-
145. See Sailor Music, 668 F.2d at 86. "The Gap store in the instant case ex-
ceeds this 'outer limit' [established in Aiken] .... Furthermore, the store is 'of
sufficient size to justify... a subscription to a commercial background music ser-
vice,'. .. a factor which further suggests Congress did not intend that the Gap store
would be exempt." Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion of the legislative his-
tory regarding size and subscription to commercial background music service see
supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
146. Sailor Music, 668 F.2d at 86; see Maslow, supra note 50, at 1081, n.123.
Gap argued that liability attached only where a user communicated the radio
broadcasts to different places or rooms within the same commercial establishment
or different establishments, and further argued that there was no further transmis-
sion because the receiver and speakers used in the one room Gap stores were
located in the same place. See Sailor Music, 668 F.2d at 86. Under section 110(5),
communications are exempt if they are not received beyond the place from which
they are sent. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 110(5).
147. See Warenski, supra note 54, at 534. The Second Circuit failed to indicate
whether the Gap stores' size merely served as evidence of a prohibited "further
transmission," or whether any establishment larger than the one in Aiken (620
square feet) automatically failed to meet the exemption. Sailor Music, 668 F.2d at
86.
148. See International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 657-58
(N.D. Ill. 1987), affd, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court stated
and the circuit court affirmed, "17 U.S.C. § 110(5) ... has three basic require-
ments for application: (1) the receiving apparatus must be of a kind commonly
used in homes; (2) the performances must not be further transmitted to the pub-
lic; and (3) the business must be a small commercial establishment." Id. (emphasis
added).
149. Mr. Kowalczyk owned and operated the Orbit restaurant. See Kowalczyk
855 F.2d at 377. In order to entertain customers, he broadcast Chicago station
'FM 100' throughout his three room restaurant via a radio receiver and eight re-
cessed ceiling speakers. See id. After ASCAP's phone calls, letters and personal
contacts failed to convince him to purchase a license, the society sent two investiga-
tors to the establishment. See id. The investigators noted six copyrighted songs
owned by ASCAP members and broadcast over the system during their visit. See id.
The ASCAP members sued for copyright infringement. See id.
The district court held that Mr. Kowalczyk failed to meet any of the three
required elements. See Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. at 657-58; for the three elements,
see supra note 148 and accompanying text. First, the district court favored AS-
CAP's expert who testified to the system's commercial quality. See Kowalczyk, 665 F.
[Vol. 4: p. 147
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linois district court in International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk 150
found that a restaurant owner, whose restaurant measured
2,664 square feet and netted annual profits of $35,000 to $136,000,
"ha[d] sufficient space and generates enough revenue tojustify the
use of a commercial background music service," thus diminishing
the nature of the use as the determining factor in considering
whether the section 110(5) exemption applies. 15 1 The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's reasoning that the large physical
size and large financial strength of a business militate against ex-
empting the use under section 110(5).152
One court used the small economic size of a business over all
other factors to find that the section 110(5) exemption applied. 15 3
In Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.,' 54 the Middle District of
North Carolina minimized the factual significance of Aiken and ex-
empted an outdoor miniature golf course that used six outdoor
speakers mounted on light poles, to communicate radio broadcasts
throughout the 7,500 square foot course.' 55 The district court
found that the golf course's seasonal business and low revenues
placed the small business within the ambit of the section 110(5)
exemption. 5 6
Supp. at 657-58. The court noted, "[the sound system] has paging capabilities and
possesses three sets of speaker terminals: 8 volts, 25 volts, and 70 volts. The re-
ceiver is capable of driving up to 40 speakers .... " Id. at 655. Second, the district
court relied on the Act's plain language defining the term "transmit," and held
that the concealed wires running between the office mounted receiver and ceiling
mounted speakers "further transmitted" the radio broadcasts. Id. at 657 (citing 17
U.S.C. § 101). Finally, the court determined that the Orbit was not the type of
small business Congress intended to exempt. See Kowalczyk 855 F.2d at 378.
150. 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aft'd, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
151. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. at 655. According to the district court, size em-
bodied at least two components: first, a physical component; and second an eco-
nomic component. See id. at 658. Despite the other elements that Mr. Kowalczyk
failed to meet, the district court found the Orbit's sheer size independently suffi-
cient to remove the case from section 110(5) exemption. See id.
152. See Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d at 375.
153. See Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C.
1985).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1117-18. Aware that the course measured over 10 times the area in
Aiken and used two more speakers, the court explained, "Nt]he size of the . . .
facility and the number of speakers are not . . . the sole or even predominant
factors to consider in determining the applicability of the exemption." Id.
156. See id. Defendant golf course owner operated the course only six months
out of the year. See id. at 1119. During this business season, the owner rarely pro-
duced more than $1,000 in business per month. See id. In rendering its decision,
the district court noted, "if any operation is 'not of sufficient size to justify... a
commercial background music service,' it is [the] Defendant's Putt-Putt course."
Id. at 1118-19.
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2. Decisional Law Based on Pure Statutory Analysis
Two recent decisions abandoned attempts to decode the com-
plex language of the legislative history. Instead, these courts fo-
cused their analysis solely on the language of the 1976 Act. In
doing so, they broke the nexus between the "small business require-
ment" and the section 110(5) exemption.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc.,1 57 the Seventh
Circuit held that section 110(5) exempted a retail chain store, de-
spite the store's relatively large physical size and gross revenues. 15s
Refusing to consider the retail chain's economic size, the district
court criticized other decisions for using legislative history to
change the meaning of the Act's plain language. 159 The Claire's
Boutiques court identified four factors referred to in the statute: (1)
the number of receiving apparatuses; 160 (2) whether the sound
system is of a type commonly used in private homes; (3) whether
music is further transmitted; and (4) whether the establishment
charges admission.1 61 The circuit court explained that, rather than
The court also noted defendant's unsophisticated sound system. See id.
Although defendant used six speakers, high distortion levels made clearly hearing
the broadcasts very difficult from all but the closest proximities. See id.
157. 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. 111. 1990), affd, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
158. Claire's, a retail chain, owned and operated 719 stores under the name
Claire's Boutiques. See Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1484-85. The stores measured
in size from 458 square feet to 2,000 square feet, and averaged 861 square feet. See
id. at 1485. At the time of the decision, Claire's had net sales of $168,674,000. See
id. Claire's provided most of its stores with a Radio Shack Optimus STA-20 5-watt
stereo receiver and two Realistic Minimus 7 speakers. See Claire's Boutiques, 754 F.
Supp. at 1325-26. The receivers were usually kept in separate rooms from the
speakers. See id. at 1326. The receivers were connected to hidden speakers via wire
running above dropped ceilings. See id. Although some stores subscribed to a
background music service on a trial basis, Claire's declined to renew the subscrip-
tion because the employees preferred to listen to the radio. See id. BMI and
Claire's entered negotiations to provide all stores with a license to play radio
broadcasts. See Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1486. BMI sued after these negotia-
tions broke down. See id.
159. See Claire's Boutiques, 754 F. Supp. at 1333. The district court explained:
[Section] 110(5) includes nothing at all about the size of a business, the
area that it covers, or the revenue that it generates. Certainly the legisla-
tive history may be useful in terms of interpreting such factors as "further
transmission" and "single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used
in private homes." It may not, however, be used to supply additional ele-
ments beyond those specified in the statute.
Id. Considering the legislative history, the circuit court noted, "[w] hat is unclear is
whether the word 'small' refers to the physical size . . . or the financial size ... 
Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1491.
160. The statute exempts only a "single receiving apparatus." 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(5).
161. Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1491 (construing 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)). The
court further stated, "[1]egislative history cannot be used to invent rules totally
unrelated to the language of the statute." Id.
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financial or physical size, the type of system used provides a far
more valuable indicator in determining whether a particular user
infringed a copyright.162 The circuit court found physical size rele-
vant only to assess a particular stereo system's reach. 163 Examining
the entire system, the court determined that infringement occurs
only when the user either: (1) uses any non-home type compo-
nents; or (2) arranges the components in a non-home type config-
uration. 1 4 The store used only home-type equipment arranged in
a typical configuration. 165 Moreover, Claire's did not further trans-
mit any performances because it did not use any device or process
that expanded the small home-type receiver's normal limits. 166
162. See id. at 1492.
163. See id. at 1494 & n.12. Although the circuit court perceived financial size
as completely irrelevant, it did not view physical size as entirely irrelevant. See id.
Using the legislative history together with an assumption that home-type systems
typically cover only a limited area, the circuit court found that a store may be able
to argue that a particular system only covers a limited portion of the store's total
square footage. See id. Significantly, the court referred to the legislative history's
Aiken example and noted that the particular Claire's stores at issue were small. See
id. at 1494. However, the court explained, "[w]e do note that... larger stores
(greater than 2,000 square feet) are closer to exceeding the size of a typical home
and thus present closer cases." Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 1493-94. Although Claire's hid both the speakers and the wir-
ing in a dropped ceiling, the circuit court affirmed the district court's holding that
these factors enjoy only minimal weight. See id. at 1494.
166. See id. at 1495. Again, the circuit court referred to legislative history, this
time stating that, had Congress intended "further transmitting" to cover any system
where the receiver and speakers were located in separate rooms, it could have
easily done so. Id. The circuit court also observed that further transmission of a
performance means more than merely running a speaker wire through a wall, or
concealing the wire. See id. The court stated:
It must entail the use of some device or process that expands the normal
limits of the receiver's capabilities. We recognize that this construction of
"further transmission" means that most systems that further transmit also
are not home-type. But since it is conceivable that even a home-type com-
ponent could further transmit under this approach, the requirement of
no "further transmission" is not mere surplusage.
Id. The circuit court noted that a number of cases held "further transmission"
occurred when users located speakers and receivers in different rooms. See id. (cit-
ing Gnossos Music v. DiPompo, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1539, 1542 (D. Me. 1989); Interna-
tional Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1987), affd, 855
F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988); Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp.
1172, 1176 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Lamminations Music v. P & X Markets, Inc., 1985
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 19,555, 19,556 1 25,790, 1985 WL 17704 (N.D. Cal.
1985); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 n.1 (W.D. Pa.
1985); Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 668 F.2d
84 (2d Cir. 1981). The circuit court explained that "[n]one of these cases relied
solely on a finding of further transmission to support its holding". Id. at 1495 n.14.
Thus, the circuit court implied that those courts did not consider the further trans-
mission requirement as carefully as they should have. See id.
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Similarly, in Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc.,167 the
Eighth Circuit refused to read into the statute any physical or finan-
cial size considerations. 16 8 On analogous facts to Claire's Boutiques,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that a
system's low grade, home-type quality and home-type configuration
brought it within the section 110(5) exemption. 169 Carrying the
narrow statutory analysis of Claire's Boutiques one step further, the
Edison Bros. court flatly refused to consider physical or financial
size. 170 However, the Eighth Circuit fell short of establishing a
bright line rule. In holding that "[t]he home style exemption
makes no sense unless it is applied on a store by store basis, to see"
whether each application fits within the section 110(5) exemption,
the district court supported an ad hoc rule for determining
whether to apply section 110(5). 171 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
argument that section 110(5) does not exempt an establishment
that can afford a subscription to a background music service. 172 In
refusing to consider size, the circuit court's section 110(5) analysis
focused primarily on the equipment used. 173
Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits abandoned previous
holdings that physical and financial size prove reliable indicators
when considering whether to apply the section 110(5) exemp-
167. 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), affd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992).
168. Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1425.
169. See Edison Bros., 760 F. Supp. at 771. Edison owned a chain of 2,500 retail
clothing and shoe stores. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1420. While some Edison
stores had obtained licenses from BMI via their subscriptions to commercial music
background services, the remaining stores used simple single receivers attached
with no more than 15 feet of wire to two speakers to play radio broadcasts. See id.
at 1420-21. In these remaining stores, Edison established a policy requiring that
low grade systems with only two speakers located within 15 feet of the receiver be
used to play only radio broadcasts. See id. When BMI's attempts to license these
remaining stores failed, Edison filed suit to obtain declaratoryjudgment. See id. at
1421. BMI appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit. See id.
170. Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1425.
171. Edison Bros., 760 F. Supp. at 771-72 (construing Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).
172. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1425. In response to BMI's argument that
Edison should not enjoy section 110(5) protection if it could afford a background
music service subscription, the circuit court explained that neither the legislative
history, nor previous opinions could persuade the Eighth Circuit to ignore the
statutory language. See id.
173. See id. The circuit court noted that had Congress intended to use size as
a factor, it could easily have written size into the statute. See id. Instead, the court
noted, "[t]he statute focuses on the equipment being used, and so must we. This
Court is not a legislative body, and it has no authority to rewrite the statute." Id.
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tion.174 Rather these courts focused on statutory language to con-
duct a scrutinizing review of the user's equipment. 175 These
decisions considered the system and its component parts as a
whole. 176 Both courts considered whether the user incorporates
any non-home-type components into the system, and whether the
user configures these components in a non-home-type manner. 177
If the user either uses any non-home-type components, or con-
figures the system in a non-home-type manner, the exemption does
not apply. 178 Concealed wiring and speakers provide only a mini-
mal indication of whether the system is non-home-type. 179 A per-
formance cannot be further transmitted unless a device or process,
like recording and playback, expands the normal limits of a re-
ceiver.18 0 However, neither case espoused a bright line rule. In-
stead, both cases support an ad hoc factual inquiry to determine
the applicability of the section 110(5) home-style exemption. 8 1
As a result of these decisions, there have arisen various legisla-
tive and private attempts to clarify the ambiguity of section 110(5).
In 1994, a proposal to amend the section 110(5) exemption was
introduced in the House of Representatives.18 2 The amendment
would eliminate both the home-style receiver requirement and the
further transmission requirement. 8 3 Instead, any transmission
would be exempt unless the business owner directly or indirectly
174. See id.; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d, 1482,
1492 (7th Cir. 1991).
175. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1424 (finding house reports irrelevant when
considering express statutory language and that other opinions relying on legisla-
tive history not binding in Eighth Circuit); Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1491
(holding legislative history cannot change meaning of statute or add further
requirements).
176. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1421-22 (relying on Claire's Boutiques); Claire's
Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1492 (considering totality of system and its components).
177. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1425 (relying on Claire's Boutiques); Claire's
Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1493 (establishing components and configuration as two
considerations for non-home-type receiver).
178. See Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1493.
179. See id. at 1494 (finding important considerations are type and sophistica-
tion of equipment, size of area in which broadcast is audible and whether equip-
ment has been augmented or integrated into public address system or other
commercial-type system).
180. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1419; Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1495
(holding that "to further transmit" means more than merely running wire through
walls or ceilings).
181. See Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1419; Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1482.
182. See H.R. 4936, 103d Cong. (1994).
183. See id.
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charged patrons to see or hear the transmission.1 8 4 This bill has
not yet been enacted into law.
On October 27, 1995 representatives from ASCAP, the Na-
tional Licensed Beverage Association (NLBA), Broadcast Music,
Inc. (BMI), and the Society of European Songwriters, Authors and
Composers, Inc. (SESAC, Inc.), reached an accord to clarify the
home style exemption. 185 The agreement contemplates an amend-
ment to section 110(5) that would consider a combination of the
establishment's size in addition to the type of equipment used. 186
The agreement refers to the Standard Industrial Code to divide
commercial users into two classes: retail businesses and eating/
drinking establishments. 18 7
On March 15, 1996 a bill was introduced to amend certain sec-
tions of the 1976 Act, including section 110(5).188 The drafter
designed the bill to provide a clear exemption for the performance
of copyrighted works in small commercial establishments.18 9 Like
184. See id. The proposed bill provides:
Section 110(5) of the title 17, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
.communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display
of a work by the public reception of the transmission by television or
radio sets located in a business establishment, unless a direct or indirect
charge is made to see or hear the transmission."
Id.
185. See Memorandum from NLBA, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC (October 31,
1995) (on file with ASCAP and author).
186. See id. The agreement seeks to clarify the home style exemption to carve
out clearer protections for small business while preserving copyright owners' rights
to control and profit from public performances of their works. See id.
187. See id. The agreement provides:
For Retail:
Radio and Television Licensing Policy.
- under 1,500 square feet in total gross leasable space, any radio and/
or TV use is exempt; ...
- over 1,500 square feet in total gross leasable space, radio use with
five or more speakers is licensable; ...
- uses over those limits are licensable.
For Eating and Drinking Establishments
Radio and Television Licensing Policy:
- under 3,500 square feet in total gross leasable space, any radio and/or
TV use is exempt; ...
- over 3,500 square feet in total gross leasable space, radio use with up to
six speakers and no more than four speakers in any room, is exempt;
- uses over those limits are licensable.
Id.
188. S. 1619, 104th Cong. (1996).
189. See id. ("To amend the provisions of title 17, United States Code, to pro-
vide for an exemption of copyright infringement for the performance of nondra-
matic musical works in small commercial establishments, and for other
purposes.").
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the 1995 ASCAP/NLBA agreement, the bill contemplates a system
of identifying exempt commercial establishments based upon the
size of the establishment and the type of equipment used. 190 The
proposed legislation however, identifies other criteria including the
kind, number and location of the equipment, gross revenues,
number of employees and "other relevant factors."' 9
190. See id. The bill first provides a blanket exemption for "small commercial
establishments" who do not make a direct charge to see or hear the transmission
and who do not further transmit the performance to the public. Id. The amend-
ment then gives the Register of Copyrights the power to define the term "small
commercial establishment" and provides a list of acceptable criteria upon which to
base the definition. Id.
191. The proposed amendment provides in relevant part:
(a) IN GENERAL.- Section 110 of title 17, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting "(a)" before
"Notwithstanding";
(2) by amending paragraph (5) to read as follows:
"(5) (A) communication of a transmission embodying a perform-
ance or display of a work (except a nondramatic musical
work) by the public reception of the transmission on a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes, unless-
(i) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(ii) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public, or
(B) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or
display of a nondramatic musical work by the public reception
of the transmission on the premises of a small commercial es-
tablishment, unless-
(i) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(ii) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public;"; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(b) (1) For purposes of subsection (a) (5) (B), the Register of Copy-
rights shall define the term 'small commercial establish-
ment' by regulation, which shall include specific, verifiable
criteria. Such criteria may relate to-
(A) the area of the establishment, including whether the es-
tablishment is of sufficient size to justify, as a practical mat-
ter, a subscription to a commercial background music
service;
(B) the kind, number, and location of equipment used;
(C) the gross revenue of the establishment;
(D) the number of employees; and
(E) other relevant factors.
(2) The definition of small commercial establishment shall not re-
sult in an exemption to the right of public performance or to
the right of public display the scope of which exceeds that per-
mitted under the international treaty obligations of the United
States.".
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IV. NARwrivE ANALYsis
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit be-
gan its determination of whether the district court properly dis-
missed the case against Muedini by examining the plain language
of the 1976 Copyright Act.1 92 The court next turned to the section
110(5) exemption.193
To determine whether section 110(5) exempted Muedini's
use, the Seventh Circuit relied almost entirely on its earlier Claire's
Boutiques decision.194 Following the Claire's Boutiques decision as
closely as a "how-to" book, the Muedini court applied the Claire's
Boutiques four-part test.195 Construing Claire's Boutiques, the Seventh
Circuit held that a user lost the exemption if the user either incor-
porated any non-home-type components, or configured home-type
equipment in a manner not commonly used in a home. 196 The
court interpreted Claire's Boutiques as holding that while financial
strength should not be considered, physical size provided a relevant
indication of a stereo system's reach. 197 Finally, as in Claire's Bouti-
ques, the Muedini court stressed that a court should consider the
entire sound system rather than merely the receiver. 198 Further-
192. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 1995).
As a procedural matter, the circuit court noted that in the face of default, the
district court properly required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were enti-
fled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 265. The circuit court affirmed that
under default circumstances, a court must assume that all plaintiffs' factual allega-
tions are true. Id. at 265-66.
193. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 266. The court noted that playing a radio fell
within the meaning of "performance" under the Act. Id.
194. See id. (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d
1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992)). For a discussion of Claire's
Boutiques, see supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
195. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 267. The Muedini court reiterated, "'the exemp-
tion is available only if (1) a single receiving apparatus is used, (2) the single re-
ceiving apparatus is of a kind commonly used in private homes, (3) the
transmission is provided free of charge, and (4) the transmission is not 'further
transmitted' to the public.'" Id. (quoting Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1489).
196. See id. (citing Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1493).
197. See id. (construing Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1494 n.10). The circuit
court rejected the Eighth Circuit's view in Edison Bros. that neither physical size nor
financial strength provided any indication of whether the section 110(5) exemp-
tion applies. See id. (construing Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954
F.2d 1419, 1424 nn.11-12 (8th Cir. 1992)).
198. Id. at 267 (construing Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1493). "If the Con-
gress had wanted the review to be limited to the receiver, it would have used the
word 'receiver' and not 'receiving apparatus.' Apparatus signifies the 'totality of
means by which a designated function is performed ... [or] a group of machines
used together.., to accomplish a task.'" Id. (quoting Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at
1493 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 120 (2d ed. 1982))).
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more, the court found it "notable whether the speakers and speaker
wire were concealed." 99
Applying these factors to the factual setting of Muedini, the
court declined to extend the home-style exemption to Muedini. 20 0
While the Seventh Circuit explained that Muedini's use met the
first and third requirements - Muedini used a single receiving ap-
paratus and provided the transmission free of charge - it con-
cluded that he failed to meet the second requirement, that the
single receiving apparatus be of a kind commonly used in private
homes. 20 1 The circuit court faulted the district court for its failure
to consider the system as a whole. 20 2 The Seventh Circuit explained
that the court below focused too closely on the system's receiver
without fully considering the system's configuration or the custom-
izing features Muedini had installed.2 0 3
The Muedini court held that Muedini both augmented his sys-
tem with non-home-style components, and configured those com-
ponents in a non-home-style manner. 20 4 The court emphasized
that Radio Shack designed Muedini's receiver "to drive only four
speakers over moderate lengths of speaker cable," and explained
that the seventy-volt transformers attached to each of the nine
speakers substantially increased the receiver's nominal impedance
load (from 8 ohms to 10,000 ohms), and allowed Muedini to use
up to 1,000 feet of wire without appreciable signal degradation. 20 5
Moreover, the court noted that Muedini's additional transformers
allowed the system to power thirty-six more speakers than under its
199. Id. (construing Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1494).
200. Muedini, 55 F.3d at 269.
201. See id. at 268. Muedini charged no fee to listen to the music. See id. The
court found that Muedini's receiver and speaker system constituted a single receiv-
ing apparatus. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id. The circuit court indicated that the district court should have ex-
amined Muedini's entire system and configuration. See id.
205. Muedini, 55 F.3d at 268. In keeping with its position of accepting plain-
tiffs' factual allegations as true on defendant's default, the Seventh Circuit de-
clined to consider the new facts presented for the first time on appeal. See id. at
264 n.2. For example, an affidavit was submitted with the amicus brief, stating that
the transformers were incompatible and not used with the system. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1995) (No.
92-C-706). The court rejected this attempt to introduce new expert testimony on
the facts. Surprisingly, although both the amicus brief and the plaintiffs'
reply brief advised the circuit court that plaintiffs erred when they alleged that
Muedini's system contained a "separate control panel," the circuit court neverthe-
less included the non-existent component in its description of Muedini's aug-
mented system. Muedini, 53 F.3d at 268; see Appellant's Reply Brief at 4 n.3, Cass
County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 92-C-706).
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original four-speaker design.20 6 Implicitly applying the Claire's Bou-
tiques physical size consideration, the court noted that the system's
evenly spaced nine speakers, together with the customized "distrib-
uted 70-volt system," provided audible music throughout the entire
1,500 square foot dining area.20 7 The circuit court also found that
the parallel wiring further enhanced the system's capabilities.2 0 8
Without explaining the weight accorded to each finding, the
court concluded that the system as a whole clearly exceeded the
characteristics of a home-style system.209 As in Claire's Boutiques, the
court here clearly declined to establish any rule regarding the
number of speakers used, and instead adhered to the circuit's ad
hoc rule that, " [w] hat is 'a single receiving apparatus of a kind com-
monly used in private homes"' must be determined on a case by
case basis.2 10
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, the Seventh Circuit closely
adhered to its easy-to-apply Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques
decision. While it simplified section 110(5) analysis when it aban-
doned financial size consideration, the court also considered inap-
propriate factors that frustrate home-style exemption analysis.2 11 In
sum, the Muedini opinion distances the Seventh Circuit's analysis
from other federal courts and underscores the need for clarifica-
tion of the home-style exemption in the form of a bright line
rule.
2 12
206. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 268.
207. Id. at 268-69.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 269.
210. Id. Notably the circuit court rejected the notion found in Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp. that a person of ordinary intelligence could understand
the precise language of exemption. See Muedini, 55 F.3d at 269 (citing Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816, 817 (9th Cir. 1982)).
211. Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1995) (con-
sidering recessed speakers and hidden speaker wire and also stating "[t] he critical
factors are the 'type and sophistication of equipment used, the size of the area in
which the broadcast is audible, and whether the equipment has been altered, aug-
mented or integrated in some fashion.'"). In rendering its decision, the Muedini
court explained that in addition to the four part test, the establishment's physical
size provided a relevant consideration for determining a stereo system's reach. Id.
The Muedini court based its decision in part, on the lower court's finding that
Muedini's system provided evenly audible sound throughout a 1,500 square foot
dining area. Id.
212. For a discussion of copyright music performance litigation, see supra
notes 56-96, 127-80 and accompanying text.
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In abandoning the financial size consideration, the Muedini
court simplified the section 110(5) analysis in two ways. First, the
court avoided the laborious task of interpreting the phrase "suffi-
cient [financial] size to justify .. . a subscription to a commercial
background music service .... "213 While other courts struggled
with the gross revenues and varying profits of a business, the
Muedini court arrived at its holding without considering these fac-
tors. 2 14 Second, the court avoided the morass of determining
which businesses could afford commercial background music sys-
tems. 215 The Muedini court properly avoided any implication that
the ability of a business to pay licensing fees can be inferred from its
ability to afford a background music service.216 Licensing organiza-
tions share no agreements to maintain equal pricing with
commercial background music services. 217 Under the "ability to af-
ford background music" theory, if commercial background music
prices increased while direct licensing fees remained constant, the
pool of businesses exempted under section 110(5) would expand in
proportion to these price increases.218 Any bright line rule consid-
ering the ability of a business to afford a background music service
would produce skewed results.
Although Muedini simplified section 110(5) by discarding the
considerations of financial size and ability to afford a background
music service, the Seventh Circuit inappropriately considered the
physical size of a business.21 9 In allowing the physical size of the
213. H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 16.
214. Compare Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (considering low revenues to exempt small business), with Inter-
national Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding finan-
cially successful restaurant beyond scope of section 110(5)).
215. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995).
216. Id. at 267.
217. For a comparison of the relative pricing for both a blanket performing
rights license and a commercial background music subscription, see supra notes 5,
119. Often, a license is less expensive than a commercial background music sub-
scription. For a discussion of this pricing differential, see supra notes 5, 119. How-
ever, many such subscriptions feature low wattage sound systems. For a discussion
of these subscriptions, see supra note 119.
218. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 817 n.158 (contending that "if music services
and radio broadcasts were substitutes for each other, the price of one would serve
as a check on the other"); see also, CAMPBELL R. McCoNNELL, ECONOMics 502 (10th
ed. 1987) (describing methods of determining cross-elasticity of demand). Per-
forming rights licensing fees influence commercial background music subscription
cost because music services pay license fees to cover both the music service's per-
formance and their subscriber's subsequent performances. See Wilk, supra note 5,
at 817 n.158. For a discussion of the multiple performance doctrine, see supra
notes 5, 66-67 and accompanying text.
219. Muedini, 55 F.3d at 267.
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restaurant to influence the sound system's scope, the Muedini court
dramatically underestimated even a low grade sound system's ability
to provide audible sound throughout a relatively large venue.22 0
For example, a 4,000 square foot enclosed area requires only one
watt of power to provide evenly audible background music. 22'
Muedini's system, before any modification, produced forty watts. 2
22
Accordingly, even in an unaltered condition, Muedini's sound sys-
tem greatly exceeded the capacity of a home-style sound system.
Under the physical size criterion, even a sound system identical to
the one in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, which Congress
clearly intended to exempt, would more than adequately provide
many venues, including the Port Town Family Restaurant, with
evenly audible background music. 2 23 Consequently, any considera-
tion of physical size by the Muedini court to determine "reach of the
sound system" possesses so little probative value regarding the
sound system's scope, that other courts should not consider the
physical size of a business in making a section 110(5)
determination. 224
Interestingly, the Muedini court departed from strict statutory
construction and precedent when it determined that recessed
220. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 805 n.1 10. Loudness is measured in units called
decibels, (dB), with 1 dB representing the threshold of audible tones and 130 dB
representing the threshold of pain. See id. Normal conversation measures around
65 dB. See id. Background music is typically played at 60-65 dBs. See id. (citing
Relative Loudness Levels of Common Sounds, STEREO REv.,Jan. 1976, at 56). Acoustical
power, which is measured in watts, is the total amount of energy radiated from an
acoustical energy source (i.e. loudspeaker). See id.
The amount of acoustical power necessary for a desired loudness may be com-
puted based upon the geometric volume of the listening space. See id. (citing
HARRY F. OLSON, MODERN SOUND REPRODUCrION 295 (1972)). Establishments with
a 10 foot ceiling and 620 (similar to Aiken) to 4,000 square feet require only .001 to
.005 watts to generate 70 dB sounds. See id. The amount of amplifier wattage
needed to produce a given sound level depends upon the speaker's efficiency rat-
ing. See id. Standard speakers operate at 1% efficiency. See id. at 294. A standard
speaker coupled with an amplifier that operates at 50% of its rated power, requires
.2 to 1 watt of power to provide background music for a listening space with a 10
foot ceiling and 620 to 4,000 square feet of floor space. See Wilk, supra note 5 at
805 n.110. Considering that Muedini's receiver operated at a 40-watt rating before
any customized improvements, such low cost systems clearly exceed any size/sound
system scope test contemplated by the Seventh Circuit.
221. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 805 n.110.
222. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 1995).
223. Multiple statements of intent suggest that Congress may have intended
courts to make an ad hoc determination of cases. See Warenski, supra note 54, at
530. Congress' choice of language in the 1976 Act to describe the home-style ex-
emption may imply that Congress assumed that small businesses are unlikely to
employ sophisticated commercial equipment. See id. However, the language is
clear that Congress intended not to exempt sophisticated sound systems.
224. Muedini, 55 F.3d at 267.
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speakers and hidden speaker wire presented "notable" considera-
tions.22 5 Both recessed speakers and hidden speaker wire represent
cosmetic, rather than system fidelity considerations. Although pre-
vious decisions considered whether a user hid speakers or wiring,
neither feature appreciably improves sound quality.226 Neither the
Act, nor'the prior cases that considered these factors important,
provide any justification for allowing recessed speakers and wiring
to influence a sound system's exemption under section 110(5).227
A review of the case law and the section 110(5) exemption
reveals many creative judicial and legislative attempts to properly
balance society's interest in the free flow of ideas, information and
commerce, with artists' interests in controlling and exploiting their
own works.228 While both the judicial and legislative branches ad-
vance a variety of approaches to help courts strike this balance,
neither agree on a bright line rule.
Congress now considers an amendment that preserves only the
direct charge prohibition and eliminates both the home-type re-
ceiving requirement and further public transmission prohibition.229
However, early copyright cases reveal the confusion inherent in
drawing the line between direct and indirect charges. 230
An easy, but perhaps over simplified solution would be to focus
upon one aspect of background music use. Either a square footage,
a maximum wattage, a maximum dB level or a maximum number
of speakers test would streamline future commercial background
copyright disputes for a number of reasons. First, users, perform-
ing rights societies and courts could easily determine whether a par-
ticular use infringed upon copyright protections. Second, each test
operates independent from profitability determinations and tech-
nological advances. Finally, the need to resolve current confusion
and judicial disagreement outweighs the obvious arbitrary nature of
tests that focus upon any one, or a combination of the above
considerations.
225. Id.
226. For a discussion of cases evaluating system components, see supra notes
131-32 and accompanying text.
227. For a discussion of the Act's language and legislative history, see supra
notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
228. For a discussion of copyright fundamentals, see supra notes 1-2 and ac-
companying text.
229. For a discussion of 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) and proposed legislation, see supra
notes 98-126, 182-91.
230. For a discussion of early court attempts to interpret "for profit" rule, see
supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
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VI. IMPACT
In abandoning the financial size consideration, the Seventh
Circuit simplified the section 110(5) analysis in two ways. First,
from the standpoint of efficiency, a court that declines to consider
financial size avoids the laborious task of interpreting the phrase
"sufficient [financial] size tojustify... a subscription to a commer-
cial background music service." 231 Previous decisions used an ap-
proach based on the users' revenues or their financial ability to
subscribe to a commercial background service, as factors in the sec-
tion 110(5) analysis.23 2 However, these courts then face
two complex and open-ended questions. First, how profitable must
a business be to afford a license?233 Second, how affordable must a
commercial background music subscription be before the Act com-
pels a business owner to subscribe or buy a license? Neither the
Act's plain language nor its legislative history suggest that a user's
liability turns on an ability to pay the cost of either a subscription or
a license.2 34 Moreover, the ability to subscribe to a commercial
background music service test inaccurately presupposes that com-
mercial background music services charge fees similar to those
charged by licensing organizations. 23 5
A second advantage offered by the Seventh Circuit's rejection
of the financial size test is that it eliminates the prospect that liabil-
ity will be predicated upon a business owner's economic circum-
stances. The financial size test potentially authorizes a financially
distressed user to publicly perform copyrighted works without a li-
231. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 75 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5816.
Compare Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C.
1985), with International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
For a discussion of the inability of courts to interpret sufficient financial size, see
supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
232. For a discussion of the small business exemption, see supra notes 140-56
and accompanying text.
233. Conceivably, even a business operating at a loss may generate substantial
revenues.
234. SeeWilk, supra note 5, at 816-817. Other sections of the Act exempt non-
profit organizations separately. For a discussion of this and similar exemptions,
see supra note 104 and accompanying text. Neither the Act nor the legislative
history indicates any intent to treat private businesses, operating at a loss, like non-
profit businesses exempted elsewhere in the Act. See Wilk, supra note 5, at 817
n.156. For a discussion of the 1976 Act's legislative history, see supra notes 107-26
and accompanying text.
235. For a comparison of the relative pricing for both a blanket performing
rights license and a commercial background music subscription, see supra notes 5,
119. Often a license is less expensive than a commercial background music sub-
scription. For a discussion of this pricing differential, see supra notes 5, 119. How-
ever, the latter often includes a low wattage sound system. For a description of
these subscriptions, see supra note 119.
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cense, while requiring his or her more profitable competitor to pay
a licensing fee for the same use. From a public policy perspective, a
more prosperous business owner suffers a penalty because he or she
must purchase a license, subscribe to a background music service,
or face copyright litigation, while a poorly run competitor
may more easily exempt its background music use under section
110(5). 236
Furthermore, a test that considers business revenue encour-
ages litigation and presents an enforceability problem. For in-
stance, if courts based infringement determinations on revenues,
licensing societies would possess virtually no way of determining a
small business' liability for copyright infringement absent pretrial
discovery. As a result, licensing societies would face more costly liti-
gation or risk widespread copyright infringement. Courts would be
left to reap this litigation harvest and weed out the meritless claims
that this illogical test encourages. 23 7 To minimize litigation costs,
the new test must allow licensing societies to make fairly accurate
preliminary determinations of copyright infringement before insti-
tuting litigation.
Absent a legislative amendment, the burden of establishing a
bright line rule for applying the section 110(5) exemption rests
with the courts. Judicial attempts to scrutinize a sound system's
every detail and its application, have done little more than lead
business owners and licensing organizations down a dark path into
copyright confusion. Rather than adding to this confusion, courts
must light the way for users and copyright owners alike by establish-
ing a rule against which these groups can prospectively gauge their
actions. Unless Congress acts, the Supreme Court should identify a
central, but common element in the sound system that can be ob-
jectively measured. Once courts identify this central aspect, they
236. Compare Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (exempting outdoor golf course six speaker system based upon
low revenues and seasonal business), with International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk,
855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding infringement based upon $35,000 to
$136,000 yearly net profit). For a discussion of the courts' inability to interpret
sufficient financial size, see supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
237. For a discussion of ASCAP's method of sending investigators into an es-
tablishment to listen to music and observe a sound system, see supra notes 33-35.
The likelihood of identifying infringement would considerably diminish if busi-
nesses could enjoy the section 110(5) exemption based on low revenues.
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can establish the desperately needed bright line rule and uniformly
apply section 110(5).
James B. MacDonald I*
* The author would like to thank Richard H. Reimer, Esq., of ASCAP for his
invaluable contributions, advice and editorial assistance.
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